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  One of corporate law’s enduring issues has been the extent to which state-to-state 
competitive pressures on Delaware make for a race to the top or the bottom.  States, or at least 
some of them, compete with their corporate law to get corporate tax revenue and ancillary 
benefits.  Delaware has “won” that race, with the overwhelming number of American large 
corporations chartering there. Here I ague that this long-standing debate is misconceived.   
Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes not from other states but from the federal 
government.  When the issue is big, the federal government takes the issue or threatens to do so, 
or Delaware players are conscious that if they mis-step, Federal authorities could step in.   
These possibilities of ouster, threat, and consciousness have conditioned Delaware’s behavior.   
This reconception a) explains corporate law developments and data that neither theory of state 
competition can explain well, b) fits several developments in takeover law, going private 
transactions, and the rhetoric of corporate governance in Delaware, and c) can be detected in 
corporate law-making in Washington and Wilmington from the very beginning in the early 20
th 
century “origins” of Delaware’s dominance right up through last summer’s Sarbanes-Oxley 
corporate governance law and the corporate governance failure in Enron and WorldCom.   
  This analysis upsets the long-standing analysis of state corporate law competition as a 
strong race (whether to the top or to the bottom) because when a corporate issue is important, 
the federal government takes it over, or threatens to do so, or Delaware fears federal action.  As 
such, we cannot tell whether Delaware, if it indeed raced to the top, did so because of the 
looming federal “threat”.  Nor can we tell whether Delaware, if it raced to the bottom, a) did so 
because national politics meant that, had they taken the locally efficient path, Congress, subject 
to wider pressures than is Delaware, would have taken the issue away, or b) would have instead 
raced to the top on other, more important issues that directly affected the mechanisms of a race 
to the top, had the states fully controlled them.  Too many of the truly important decisions, the 
ones that could affect capital costs—the mechanism driving the race-the-top theory—are taken 
away from Delaware or are at risk of removal or the Delaware actors know could be taken 
away if they seriously damaged the national economy or riled powerful interests. That is not to 
say that what happens at the state level in corporate law is trivial, but that the results are 
ambiguous in terms of the race debate. If efficiency is the usual result, then the Federal vertical 
element could correspond to the strengths of other organizational structures (like separating 
proposals from ratification in decision-making, of the checks and balances in the M-form 
corporation).  If inefficiency is the usual result, we do not know whether the states, if free to 
compete without a federal “veto” possibility, would have raced toward efficiency.  When we 
add this “vertical,” Federal-state competition atop the horizontal state competition in 
corporate law, the state race debate—one that has stretched across the 20
th century from 
Brandeis to Cary and beyond—is rendered empirically and theoretically indeterminate. DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of state competition for corporate charters—is it a race to the top or 
the bottom?—is one of corporate law’s enduring corporate issues, one that goes back 
to the origins of the modern American corporation at the beginning of the 20
th century 
and that persisted through the century in policy debates touched off by former heads of 
the SEC, Supreme Court opinions on state authority in corporate law, and continuing 
important academic analyses.  Even today, as I write, new data is brought forth to 
support the proposition that the race is to the top,
1 or the bottom,
2 and political 
authorities, judges and commentators wonder whether the crises and scandals at Enron 
and WorldCom were produced by a race to the bottom, or could now be corrected by a 
race to the top. 
Here I argue that this debate is misconceived, and badly so.  Whether or not the 
states are racing,
3 and whether they are racing to the top,
4 or the bottom,
5 we live in a 
Federal system, and the Federal government can, and often does, take over issues of 
national economic importance.  The very issues that are most likely to move into the 
Federal arena—securities trading during a Depression, takeovers in the 1980s, 
corporate governance today after a series of scandals—are the issues that could affect 
firm value so strongly that they’d be central to state-to-state competition.  Yet these 
issues—the most fundamental aspects of corporate governance—are the very ones that 
induce the strongest possibility of Federal removal, and that risk of removal heavily 
                                                           
* Berg Professor of Corporate Law, Harvard Law School.  Thanks for early conversations on 
the topic go to my colleagues Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates, Allen Ferrell, Jeffrey Gordon, Howell 
Jackson, Reinier Kraakman, Mark Ramseyer, and Guhan Subramanian. 
1 Robert Daines, Does Delaware Incorporation Improve Firm Value?  62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 
(2001) (Delaware law enhances shareholder value by as much as 5% of the value of the firm). 
2 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition 
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 2002) (answering the question from the 
paper’s title:  no) . 
3 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 2002) (states do not in fact compete; Delaware has a monopoly). 
4 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 21 (1993); 
Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited:  Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 913 (1982). 
5 William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974); Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558 n.34 (1933) (Brandeis dissenting); Lucian Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation:  The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992); ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).  Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporation Law, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 469 (1987) (Delaware bar as powerful 
interest group in shaping Delaware corporate law). DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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influences the Delaware result, even when Federal authorities in the end do not take 
the issue away.   When it’s important either a) the Federal authorities take it away, or 
b) they threaten to do so, or c) the Delaware players are conscious that a mis-step could 
induce Federal action. 
Even when, as now, the Federal government does not threaten to take away 
Delaware’s chartering business in its entirety—although it did seriously threaten to do 
so three times in the 20
th century—Delaware players know that the Federal 
government can take away the corporate law-making function in whole or in part, and 
that it certainly has, on issues big and small.  The Federal government takes away the 
issues—big and small—often enough so that Delaware players can never be oblivious 
to the possibility of being displaced.  And, as such, we have never had, and we could 
never have, a true state-to-state race in corporate law.   
Delaware has competition, even if it never looks over its shoulder at another 
state.  Indeed, Delaware’s competition in making corporate law comes not primarily 
from other states but, primarily, from the Federal government.  It comes from 
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission, not California, Nevada, Ohio, 
or New York. It comes from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in interpreting the 
expanse of the securities laws, not a new commercial court in another state.
6  Even if it 
had all the chartering business, Delaware need not get all (or at the limit, any) of the 
business of making corporate law. 
This interaction then has deep implications for the race debate:  First, there is no 
certainty to the mechanism that is said to produce a race to the top:  Even if empirical 
evidence showed incontrovertibly that Delaware was racing to the top, we would not 
know whether state-to-state competition over charters produced the result, or whether 
the result came from the threat of federal ouster.  And, if empirical evidence showed 
incontrovertibly that Delaware was racing to the bottom, we would not know whether 
Delaware reluctantly adopted inefficient law because it feared that congressional 
politics or errant judicial decisions or an out-of-control SEC would have ousted 
Delaware had it taken the efficient path.   
Second, if Delaware law is in fact efficient, we need a better understanding of 
the mechanisms that would produce that efficiency:  it cannot be pure state-to-state 
chartering competition because Delaware is heavily influenced by the potential for 
federalization.  There may indeed be a “genius” to American corporate law,
7 and it 
may indeed involve regulatory competition, but if we have obtained optimal corporate 
law, or at least good corporate law—an open issue—the United States did so not based 
on state-to-state competition but on a structure akin to state proposal with the 
possibility of Federal veto.  The actual American structure corresponds to 
organizational structures than a pure competitive market: its structure corresponds to 
the separation of proposal and ratification in management theory (i.e., states can act, 
subject to the possibility that another authority will change the result), and some 
variety of that kind of theory would be the basis for a theory of good corporate law-
                                                           
6 And it comes from the New York Stock Exchange, which itself is often prodded to act by 
the SEC or Congress. 
7 The phrase is from Roberta Romano’s highly respected book on the subject.  ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  3  
 
making, if state corporate law is in fact on the whole efficient.  More likely, corporate 
law, like other law, would have to be re-cast as an amalgam of efficiency, mistake, 
interest-group pressures, and happenstance.  The result may be more ordinary than the 
racing engines corporate law scholars have designed, but more realistic. 
*   *   * 
So the concept here is that corporate chartering is only one way to make the 
corporate law that governs the nation’s largest corporations.  A state might grant 
corporate charters, but Congress could make—and often has made—the rules.  States 
like Delaware that want to provide a network for corporate-law decision-making—in 
its courts, legislature, and law firms—cannot look just to other states but must be 
conscious of how the federal government could react.  The federal government can 
make the corporation’s corporate law.  And if it does so, it displaces state corporate 
law-making, even if the state retains the (at the limit, merely ministerial) authority to 
issue the charter.  In securities law, and much else, this authority has passed from 
Delaware to the Federal government, and much that remains in Delaware is affected by 
the possibility of more passing from Delaware to Washington. 
Understanding Washington’s gravitational pull on Delaware’s acts helps to 
resolve open issues in the Delaware race debate.  Consider this:  Delaware was a 
moderate in the 1980s antitakeover game.  Other states passed severely antitakeover 
corporate law; Delaware did not.  Delaware’s moderation provided significant 
shareholder value, takeover theorists suppose.  Yet, by end of the decade, Delaware’s 
decisions were strongly antitakeover, to the point that some commentators considered 
the Delaware result close to the “just say no” defense that it had previously rejected for 
a “proportionality to the threat” standard.  If Delaware raced to the top in 1980s (or 
resisted dropping to the bottom), one wonders why it stopped by 1990, or thereabouts.   
What changed?  And the race-to-the-bottom theory has equally severe problems:  if 
Delaware gets the chartering business principally by pandering to managers, one 
wonders why it took them nearly a decade to get there.  The issues were obvious to the 
Delaware players. Other states were passing severe anti-takeover laws, while 
Delaware’s legislature refused to do so at first, and then was moderate, while its court 
decisions zig-zagged until 1989 or so, with “proportional-to-the-threat” standards in 
Unocal and powerful anti-managerial auction rules in Revlon.  Not only were the 
issues obvious and not only were the other states doing as managers asked them to, but 
the threat of re-chartering out of Delaware was not just “in the air.”  By 1988, Martin 
Lipton’s famous Memo to Clients—distributed to all who were interested, reported in 
the press, and surely read by the Delaware players—recommended to corporate 
America that the exodus from Delaware begin.  Yet Delaware did not immediately go 
over to the antitakeover side in the 1980s.   
Neither race theory does well here in explaining how Delaware’s takeover rules 
developed.  Yet takeovers are the most fundamental corporate law issue of the past 
quarter-century.  Theories that cannot explain the most important phenomena they 
purport to cover need to be modified. 
When we add the federal government to the picture, we get a much crisper 
picture.  The Federal government was overall taking middle-of-the-road position on 
takeovers in the 1980s—with a very active pro-takeover SEC, a moderately DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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antitakeover Congress, and, for a time, a pro-takeover judiciary.  Then the federal 
authorities left the field one-by-one at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s.   
Before the Federal authorities left the field, the Delaware decisions zig-zagged, sought 
proportionality standards, and were sometimes pro-takeover.  And the Delaware 
legislature passed, as is well-known, one of the most moderate of the antitakeover 
statutes, one with only mild bite.  Then, after the Federal authorities left the field 
(judicial decisions turned around with Supreme Court’s CTS  decision, personnel 
changes at the SEC made it less pro-takeover, and Congress lost interest), Delaware 
decisions became more persistently pro-manager and more persistently anti-takeover. 
With the vertical, Federal relationship in mind, we get a much better 
explanation than any other in existence, about why Delaware lagged the other states in 
producing anti-takeover law, and then became about as antitakeover as its state 
competitors:  Delaware held off from becoming severely pro-managerial while 
Congress was mulling and the SEC was strongly pro-takeover.  When Congress and 
the SEC receded, Delaware could move.  The movement over time of Delaware’s 
takeover law and the change over time in new powerful data on takeovers are both best 
explained by this fear-of-federalization sequence, but fit neither a pure race-to-the-top 
nor a pure race-to-the-bottom theory.  
The hostile takeover is not the only corporate institution whose governing law 
can be better explained with Delaware-Washington interaction.  Other major corporate 
events in the 20
th century were also contests between state and federal authority, with 
federal authority usually winning, either directly via a new statute or regulation, or 
indirectly via inducing rules at the state or self-governing level.  Delaware’s famous 
decision that froze the raider T. Boone Pickens out of a target company self-tender for 
stock induced the SEC to replace Delaware’s selective tender with Rule 14d-10, the 
SEC’s all holders rule.  Delaware’s reticence in the face of a wave of dual-class 
recapitalizations (transactions that led public shareholders midstream to end up without 
any future right to vote) was reversed first by the SEC and then, when the SEC failed, 
by the stock exchanges under SEC prodding.  Going private transactions of the 1970s 
were first welcomed in Delaware then heavily regulated when the SEC threatened 
preemption.   
And the federal-state move is not just one from recent decades:  The securities 
laws themselves were designed to displace what were perceived to be the most failed 
sector of state regulation.   Even the earlier, beginning of the 20
th-century origin of the 
Delaware-New Jersey race was a three-way contest among the federal government and 
the two states, with the federal government taking over, as we shall see, the most 
important issues from the states for direct federal regulation.   
The recent wave of corporate governance failures led Congress to pass a new 
law that federalizes important elements of corporate governance that were previously 
state-controlled and self-regulatory. The state and self-regulatory mechanisms allowed 
by the states, having been perceived as failing, are displaced, and the Delaware actors 
are painfully aware that Sarbanes-Oxley partially federalizes many of their institutions.  
*  *  * 
In Part I, I briefly outline current theory.  In Part II I show the myriad 
mechanisms by which federal law-makers can, and do, set aside Delaware law.  We DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  5  
 
have a concept that the internal affairs of the corporation are to be left to state law, but 
this is only a tradition, one that is regularly dishonored, but frequently then “saved” by 
re-conceptualizing the federalized affair as “external” not internal, and therefore no 
longer appropriate for pure state regulation.  We see how the mechanism of ouster 
could be via congressional action, SEC rule-making, judicial interpretation, or New 
York Stock Exchange listing requirements made under SEC influence.   
In Part III, I show that federal authority regularly threatens to displace the states 
and regularly does replace state rules:  federal incorporation was seriously on the 
agenda in three decades in the 20
th century.  Federal authority has taken over securities 
trading, shareholder voting—arguably the single most important internal affair of the 
corporation—and most of the mechanics of accounting in public firms.  Controversies 
on going private, dual-class recapitalization, the range of fiduciary duties (in the 1960s 
and 1970s), and takeovers (in the 1980s) all threatened to go federal or actually did go 
federal.  Recently, two lesser federal corporate statutes simply displaced all state laws 
to the contrary, not even bothering to pursue the old deference to parallel regulation.  
And one major statute—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—prescribes corporate rules 
that cannot be considered anything other than “internal affairs” of all large American 
corporations.  Even today Delaware’s corporate law-making business is in federal 
jeopardy. 
In Part IV, I address the theoretical implications.  The United States has not had, 
and cannot have, a pure race to the top.  Anything important enough to affect the key 
mechanisms of the race to the top—law that raises or lowers capital costs—is 
important enough to attract federal attention.  Often over the 20
th century decisions 
moved from Delaware to Washington.  And when the issue did not attract explicit 
action from Washington, what Delaware did was often affected by what Washington 
was thinking about doing.  Even if evidence showed beyond doubt that actual 
Delaware law raced the top, we cannot tell whether it raced there because of fear of 
federalization or because of interstate competition.  The race to the bottom theory is 
equally indeterminate.  If the states clearly produced defective corporate law, we 
cannot tell for sure whether they did so because of mechanisms intrinsic to the race, or 
because the federal overlay of congressional politics, inattention and happenstance 
induced the inferior result. 
And then I conclude:  the mechanisms that would make for a pure race (to the 
top or the bottom) are absent in a true federal system, such as the United States.  The 
idea here is not just theoretical:  hardly a decade has gone by without the federal 
government considering taking over some major corporate issue from the states, 
suggesting that Delaware’s strongest competitor has been, and probably still is, 
Washington.  This renders the mechanisms of the race impossible or indeterminate.  If 
the corporate issue is important, it becomes a federal issue, not a purely state-law 
Delaware issue.  That result is as one should expect, and the race analysis must yield to 
a wider perspective on what makes for corporate law. 
 DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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I.   CURRENT THEORY 
 
We have a long, important debate, one that has engaged several of the best 
minds in corporate scholarship and corporate activism, from Brandeis to Cary, on 
whether state competition pushes state corporation law to the top (in terms of 
efficiency for shareholders) or the bottom (in terms of favoring managers over 
shareholders).  A brief review of that debate is in order before we cordon it off and 
minimize its overall importance. 
 
A. Delaware’s Advantages 
 
Delaware is a small state, and its advantages in any race derive largely from its 
small size.  Revenues from the corporate franchise tax are a large fraction of the state’s 
budget, 15-20%, amounting to several hundred million dollars annually, and on a per 
capita basis turn out to be a noticeable sum of money for each Delaware resident.  The 
corporate bar can influence the legislature (and perhaps the judiciary), in ways that 
larger states would ignore.  Local interest group pressures from, say, labor unions and 
corporate management are weak, because the state is not heavily industrialized.  The 
average citizen has a stake in keeping the revenues but not much of a stake in what the 
rules actually are.  This makes for something akin to organized private law-making 
among the corporate players. 
Delaware also has a specialized, highly regarded judiciary, operating without a 
jury.  The judges take pride in keeping up with business trends, on having good 
business sense, on knowing their own limits, and on reacting quickly as professionals.  
The body of judicial precedent and knowledge establishes a network, one that would 
be costly for a single player to leave.
8 
 
 B. Racing to the Bottom 
 
The race to the bottom was nicely articulated early on by Justice Brandeis in 
Liggett v. Lee: 
Lesser States, eager for revenue derived from that traffic in charters 
had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws….   The 
race was not one of diligence but of laxity….  [T]he great industrial 
States yielded in order not to lose wholly the prospect of the revenue 
and control incident to domestic incorporation.
9 
And in modern times, the perspective was picked up by William Cary, articulating the 
race to the bottom view he developed while chair of the SEC: 
                                                           
8 See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:  Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory 
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). 
9 288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1932).  DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  7  
 
[T]he first step [for improving corporate law] is to escape from the 
present predicament in which a pygmy among the 50 states 
prescribes, interprets,  and indeed denigrates national corporate 
policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders. 
…
10 
Delaware, the race-to-the-bottom theory runs, provides a corporate law that 
panders to managers, often at the expense of shareholders.  Shareholders cannot make 
the reincorporation decision alone, as corporate law requires that they act only after the 
board—the managers—recommends reincorporation.
11  The first actor in the 
reincorporation decision is the board, and the states give the managers whatever they 
want.  Shareholders are too dispersed in the public corporation to control the situation, 
and they usually just rubber-stamp managers’ recommendations, if they ever actually 
to get to decide.  The standard collective action problem makes it not worthwhile for 
the shareholders to organize and second-guess managers on a reincorporation decision. 
More nuanced analyses point out that Delaware has a network advantage, and 
that network advantage gives shareholders a “plus” which can then be spent on pro-
managerial substantive rules.
12  Or the reincorporation decision comes in a “good 
news” package:  the firm is expanding and makes a big stock offering at the time it 
reincorporates, or it considers a good news merger.  Shareholders, happy with the 
overall result, approve the set of board proposals.
13  Empirical analyses show that 
much recent reincorporation involves movement from states—like California—that are 
seen as tough pro-shareholder states, into Delaware,
14 and that states that have the most 
anti-takeover, pro-manager rules retain more corporate charters than states that are less 
enthusiastic in protecting managers from takeovers.
15  
 
C.  Racing to the Top 
 
The process of pandering to managers can go only so far.  States that 
systematically hurt a firm’s operations would raise their firm’s cost of capital, as 
                                                           
10 Cary, supra note 5, at 701 (emphasis supplied. 
11 E.g., Del. Gen’l Corp. L. §§ 241, 251. 
12 Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757 (1995); Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 2. 
13 Bundling is harder to do after the 1992 SEC proxy amendments, but still possible.  Note 
again that federal authority, not state authority, made issue-bundling harder for managers. 
14 Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: 
Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2001). 
15 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 2.  Kahan & Kamar recently concluded that no other 
state is racing against Delaware in corporate chartering.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3.  No one tries 
to get the corporate revenues, even the other small states, they argue.  This is a major contribution to 
understanding the race and its limits.  However, in my view, this fact, even if true fails to end the race 
analysis.   The race could be one of contestable markets:  if Delaware riles managers (in the bottom 
view) or hurts firms badly (in the top view), corporate players will rush to Rhode Island or North 
Dakota to convince them to create a new corporate law.  Even if these states are not now racing, the 
corporate players who would benefit from ending Delaware’s dominance would show them what to 
do.  That’s how it happened for New Jersey and then Delaware.  This contestable markets structure 
gives the dominant state room to maneuver in the short run, but a big error could induce a mass and 
irreversible exodus, as New Jersey experienced a century ago. DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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eventually capital markets participants understand that the firm is weaker, earns less, 
and is not as strong as another firm from another state.  Over the long-run this damage 
to the firms’ capital-raising capacity will take its toll:  the firms’ managers will realize 
that in the long-run they are weakening the firm by reincorporating in that bad-law 
state, the pot for all to split (shareholders and managers) has to diminish in size and 
that cost would motivate the players to reincorporate elsewhere.  At the limit the firm 
could disappear, either in bankruptcy or via a takeover from a stronger firm in a 
neighboring state with better corporate law.
16  Bad corporate law might persist, but the 
firms incorporated under that bad law would, one way or another, not. 
This or that corporate rule might in isolation not seem to be pro-shareholder—a 
rule, say, limiting shareholders right to sue.  But not all rights and remedies are 
efficient.  Some diminish the capacity of the organization to act and, the theory runs, 
those that diminish the capacity to act effectively tend to be discarded, and those that 
tend to improve the organization for shareholders tend to persist.   
Delaware’s efficiencies are often proclaimed, and data sometimes produced to 
support that view.
17 
 
II.  THE FEDERAL BEHEMOTH: THEORY AND MEANS 
 
Federal authorities are not playing the same game, and are subject to differing 
motivations and pressures.  That is, in both the top and the bottom race, the states are 
looking to gain revenue from the chartering business. Other considerations might come 
into play—satisfying local interest groups, for example—but the franchise tax is a key 
motivator (up in one theory, down in the other).  But for Federal authorities this 
revenue is just too small a part of the Federal budget.  Other considerations come into 
play for the Federal authorities:  management of the economy overall on the high end, 
with concomitant goals of protecting investors and consumers.  On the low-end, 
Federal authorities are subject to interest-group pressures, including pressures from 
groups that have more clout in Washington than in any one state.  Some Federal 
authorities would be interested in how the issue plays out in the media, or where 
campaign contributions could be garnered.  And most corporate law issues are likely to 
be lower down on the federal agenda than they are on Delaware’s agenda, so Federal 
authorities, with limited attention, might not give the corporate issue enough attention.  
And when they give it enough attention, even high-end, public-regarding attention, a 
Federal rule could squelch variety too quickly, foreclosing a dispersed polity from 
gaining new information that would over time improve corporate law.   
The point here is not the Federal authorities are systematically better or worse 
than the states, but that what motivates and pressures the Federal authorities differs 
from what motivates the states in general and Delaware in particular. They’re not 
necessarily playing the same chartering game, and they may not even be moving to the 
same goal.   
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A.  The Internal Affairs Doctrine 
 
If one were to only read the doctrinal surface, one might think there was a sharp 
distinction between state and federal corporate law-making during the 20
th century.  
States govern the internal affairs of the corporation, while the federal authorities, 
namely the SEC, govern the external trading in the firm’s securities.  The structure is 
sometimes stated in federal decisions,
18 and more often proclaimed by Delaware 
players as proper, traditional, and in need of deep respect.  Even the Enron debacle, 
said the chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court only a few months ago,
19 would 
be better dealt with at the state level.  Whether he was right or wrong, just three 
months after his speech, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Law of 2002, a 
sweeping reconstruction of corporate governance in large firms in the United States, a 
matter that might have been thought to be one of the internal affairs of the corporation. 
The difficulty with the internal affairs doctrine as permitting a state-to-state race 
is that it is just an understanding not, say, a crisp constitutional rule of how corporate 
regulation must be allocated.  And it’s an understanding that is breached much more 
often than Delaware might like.  It is breached formally, as when Federal authorities 
just go ahead and regulate internal affairs, as the federal authorities did in Sarbanes-
Oxley and related initiatives, mandating board structures and authority.  And it is 
breached informally, as Federal authorities, in the guise of regulating, say, disclosure 
to securities markets, effectively control the underlying governance structure of the 
corporation, the very internal affairs that state law is said to govern. 
Indeed, all of corporate law could be federal law.  This is an obvious point, but 
needs to be recalled.  The interstate commerce authority means that the internal affairs 
doctrine can be no more than an understanding, not a sharp limit on Federal law-
making.  Indeed, from time-to-time there is serious talk of federal chartering of firms 
in interstate commerce, a proposal that although not serious today at the beginning of 
the 21
st century, arose three times in the 20
th century (in the 1900s-1910s, the 1930s, 
and the 1970s) as serious proposals.
20  In banking, the federal government gave itself 
chartering authority, and when it wanted state-chartered banks to comply with federal 
policy, it required them to do so.
21  Congress, were it so inclined, could do so for 
America’s large firms. 
But the issue of federal incorporation fades, as Congress moves on to other 
agenda items.  And the incorporation decisions are left to the states.  The last serious 
effort at federal incorporation passed by the end of the 1970’s.  Yet it still is on the 
minds of Delaware players (who understand the fragility of their franchise and chafe 
under the criticisms they endured a quarter-century ago). 
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Full federal incorporation is not the only means by which Federal authorities 
can displace state law.  Federal authorities—Congress, the SEC, the courts—can take 
individual items up for federal action.  And, as we shall see in Part IV, one or the other 
regularly has.  When a big issue arises, either the courts (think: the burgeoning fraud 
liability of 1960s, threatening to turn, and actually turning many, state fiduciary duties 
into federal causes of action); or the SEC (think of the going private activity of the 
1960s and 1970s), or Congress (think: executive compensation in the 1990s finding 
itself regulated via the internal revenue code or federal corporate governance mandates 
via Sarbanes-Oxley and associated initiatives) can take the issue or can consider taking 
the specific issue, pushing Delaware into a corner.  Federal incorporation would be the 
clearest ouster of state law, but there are so many other ways by which federal 
authorities can take the production of corporate law away from the states.  
They can, and they often have.  
 
B. Who are the Federal Authorities? 
 
Just to be explicit, we have three fundamental federal authorities, each of which 
can make and threaten to make corporate law.   
1. Congress, of course. Consider, for example, corporate voting, perhaps the 
core “internal affair” of the corporation.  Lawyers who work on corporate voting know 
that they are operating primarily not under state law, but under Federal proxy law, 
section 14 of 1934 Act.  The 1934 Act effectively has made many voting rules federal 
rules, not state rules, and it could take away the rest were the SEC so inclined.  Or 
governance issues like executive compensation can be controlled (or hoped to be 
controlled) via tax law.  Sarbanes-Oxley shows how Congress, when it so wishes, can 
micro-manage corporate law:  mandating managerial duties, allocating authority inside 
the corporation, and so on.  If it wishes, it can swoop in and take over any major aspect 
of corporate law, as it often has, and more often has threatened to. 
2. And the SEC. The SEC has broad authority to regulate securities trading.  
Much securities regulation can impinge upon, or over-turn, state corporate governance 
rules.  Consider one explicit one, and one subtle one.  When Delaware validated a 
corporation offering to buy back stock from its stockholders (a transaction internal to 
the corporation, just between its shareholders and the firm), and excluded one large 
shareholder—the raider, the SEC responded with its “all holders rule,” obliterating the 
state rule.
22  Or consider who runs the corporation:  Delaware says straight out that 
management of Delaware corporations is vested in the board of directors.  No 
exceptions for the ordinary business of the corporation: it’s the board, not the 
shareholders who run the operation.  And hence, a proxy proposal to direct the board to 
do an ordinary management act is impermissible under Delaware law.  But now, in a 
subtle evolution, the SEC is mandating that managers include “precatory” resolutions 
from shareholders on such items in the company’s annual proxy solicitation.  “Voice” 
is not direction and the structure leaves boards formally empowered to ignor their 
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shareholders, but voice changes outcomes and it is a step closer to power, a subtle 
change in the internal authority state law had set up. 
3. And the courts. Whether a shareholder can sue can obviously determine 
corporate law.  Perhaps to a lawyer it is the most basic right of the shareholder.  And as 
is well-known to securities lawyers, the federal courts opened up a huge area of 
liability under the securities laws in the 1960s and 1970s, implying private rights of 
action in a way that was substantially turning state fiduciary rules into federal law.  
The fact that the Supreme Court cut back on the doctrinal bases for the expansion by 
the late 1970s, does not mean that this a) was not real and a constraint on state 
behavior, and b) was an aberration that could not happen again via other means. 
4. And the stock exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange makes many rules 
that govern the largest American corporation, rules that affect corporate internal 
affairs, the stuff of ordinary state law-making.  The rules now regulate voting 
disparities, i.e., whether a one-share, one-vote rule would apply, or whether voting 
strength is variable.  One might think that the NYSE is really a fully private self-
regulatory organization, but that is not so.  It’s susceptible to a great deal of informal 
(and formal) influence from SEC.  Even when the SEC lacks informal authority, it 
often induces the NYSE to act. 
 
III.    DELAWARE’S MAIN COMPETITOR IN MAKING CORPORATE LAW: 
            WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
A. Can Displace 
 
So, notwithstanding that fragile internal affairs doctrine, the Federal 
government can displace state corporate law, and rather easily.  Legislation can pre-
empt state corporate law, explicitly or implicitly, and it has.  Judicial interpretation of 
open-ended legislation can occupy the field, leaving no room for state corporate law, 
as it has on a few sharp, and very important occasions.  Open-ended delegations to the 
SEC can give the SEC the power to muscle aside the states from a regulatory area, and 
they have been.  And the securities laws themselves can directly pull away corporate 
law issues from the states, as it has for voting and more.  As the leading securities 
regulation analyst of his time said: “I think it’s not too much to say that [key 
provisions of the 1934] Exchange Act … [are] at least second cousin, if not first 
cousin, to federal incorporation in substance, not in form.”
23 
These federal forays could affect the state incorporation business even without 
direct federal preemption:  That is, their most important effect here is that a) corporate 
law could be made elsewhere than in the states, and b) the states, especially Delaware, 
are deeply affected by the possibility of Federal law-making.  But there’s even more.  
Even if Delaware is fully unconscious of the prospect of Federal law-making, Federal 
law-making can deeply affect state-to-state incorporations:  Imagine that the Federal 
government leveled the field by determining all important issues.  If so, then there 
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would be no advantage to incorporating in Delaware.  Delaware would lose excess tax 
revenues from incorporation because then the race would be to provide the lowest 
franchise tax (since the states could not vary core corporate law any more than they 
can now vary securities law or the federal corporate tax).  Delaware would become less 
important and Delaware corporate players peripheral.  When a corporate issue moves 
into the federal arena there is that much less for states to race about, whether to the top 
or the bottom.  Every time federal authorities take an issue over, Delaware becomes 
less important as the locus of corporate decision-making.  Its power to charge a high 
franchise fee diminishes.  And the psychological and other benefits that local players 
get (those Delaware law firms, those important chancery court judges) become less 
lucrative and less psychologically important, because the locus of active decision-
making lies elsewhere. 
 
B. Can Inspire Fear 
 
Delaware players have reason to fear that if they mis-step, they will lose the 
law-making business.  They know that the federal authorities, even if not breathing 
down the Delaware corporate necks at every moment, could act.  If Delaware does 
something badly wrong that instigates public policy-makers in Congress or the SEC to 
act, Delaware will lose the business.  If Delaware does something that deeply offends 
an interest group with clout in Congress, Delaware could lose the business.  Even on 
an issue where the Federal authorities are thus far silent, Delaware has reason to be 
looking over its shoulder at Washington as much as, or more, as at any other state. 
1. Federal incorporation. And Delaware has reason to fear that everything 
could be federalized.  Not now, in the present environment, but if Delaware slipped 
badly.  Look at the history of federal incorporation, which was seriously on the 
Washington policy agenda in three decades of the 20
th century.
24  In the century’s first 
decade: 
The U.S. Industrial Commission [in Washington] lodged a thinly 
veiled complaint against New Jersey, complaining that [a state’s] 
corporate regulation couldn’t stick [if tough] because a tough state 
would be displaced by another state like New Jersey.
25 
Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson each sought mandatory federal incorporation 
during that era.
26  And the prospect of federal chartering of corporation engaged in 
interstate commerce seriously arose again in the 1930’s.  The Presidency,
27 the 
Congress in general,
28 and the head of Congressional Temporary National Committee 
                                                           
24 The serious proposals to federalize corporate law are described and sourced in Note, 
Federal Chartering of Corporations:  A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972). 
25 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1919, 49 J. ECON. 
HIST. 677, 686  (1989). 
26 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 108 (2d ed. 1961). 
27 Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover 
Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1051 n.69 (1986), citing Letter from the President of the United 
States to the Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee (Jan. 25, 1934). 
28 Roper & Dickerson Report, S. Comm. Print, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in 4 
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in particular, all pushed the idea,
29 and the SEC
30 seriously studied it.  Consider this 
summary of the New Deal view: 
Roosevelt committed himself to the long-held populist and 
progressive goal of superseding lax state corporation laws with more 
stringent federal standards.  His security policy was an attempt to 
remedy the weaknesses in the four bodies of state and private rules 
then in effect, which cumulatively failed to minimize fraud or 
unfairness in the initial sale of corporate securities. 
Most fundamental of the rules Roosevelt sought to supersede were 
the state corporation laws.  Originally the state corporate statutes had 
been restrictive, limiting, among other things, the amount of capital a 
business firm could raise.  But [then the states raced to the bottom].
31 
So the securities laws were passed, partly in the view that state law failed to 
handle some important corporate problems.  And later during the 1930s, the core 
legislation coming from Congress’s main economic committee during the depression 
sought to finish the job begun with the securities laws, by “completing the 
federalization of business law.”
32  Senator O’Mahoney said:  that ‘[s]ince … national 
commerce is carried on by national corporations, it should be the Federal Government 
and not the State governments which … describe and outline the powers of the 
corporations … .”
33   The Senator would have had federal rules determine fiduciary 
duties, determine voting rights, had shareholders vote on executive compensation, 
judicial review of stock issuances, and set up alternative proxy mechanisms to the 
management controlled proxy machinery.
34  If that were not enough to end Delaware’s 
franchise, the bill would have required that the place of incorporation be the place of 
the company’s main business,
35 a requirement that would have ended Delaware’s race 
to anywhere. 
And then in the 1970s, William Cary, by-then a former chair of the SEC, 
brought the issue back, as it turned into a American Bar Association study:  Cary said 
that it was time to end Delaware’s influence on corporate law.  Either corporate law 
should be national for firms in interstate commerce, or federal rules should establish a 
minimal set of standards that would cover all corporations in the United States.   
                                                                                                                                                   
Economic Committee, Final Report and Recommendations, Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77
th Cong., 1st Sess. 
24 (1941) (the TNEC actually came down on the side of national standards, short of national 
incorporation). 
29 The head of Congressional committee was Senator O’Mahoney.  He describes his efforts, 
which continued through the Depression, World War II, and its aftermath, in an article entitled with 
his goal.  Joseph G. O’Mahoney, Federal Charters to Save Free Enterprise, 1949 WISC. L. REV. 407, 
415 (1949). 
30 LOSS, supra note 26, at 110 n.17. 
31 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 42 (1982). 
32 Boyer, supra note 27, at 1052.  See O’Mahoney, supra note 29.  
33 Hearings on S.10 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. 270-71 (1937).  And, said the Senator, “if a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce 
… the representatives of the people of the United States [ought to] defin[e] … its power.”  Id. at 441. 
34 Boyer, supra note 27, at 1053. 
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2. Federal minimal standards. William Cary’s proposal—coming in one of the 
most cited law review articles—side-stepped federal incorporation, with a proposal for, 
in lieu of a national corporate law, a set of national minimum national corporate 
standards,
36 an idea that Congress then picked up with proposals to mandate 
independent directors, require key board committees to have a majority of independent 
directors, and to have shareholders vote on more matters.
37  (These proposals, radical 
at the time, eventually became the norm, some by accretion, some by practice, some by 
stock exchange rules, some by SEC rules.)   
Consider Cary’s influential article alone.  Little could threaten Delaware more 
than to read the plan of a then-recent Chair of the SEC for federal standards of 
corporate action, dealing with Delaware not by praising its expert and savvy judges but 
by dismissing it as a pygmy.
38  Corporate law must be improved, said Cary, and 
The first step is to escape from the present predicament in which a 
pygmy among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, and indeed 
denigrates national corporate policy as an incentive to encourage 
incorporation within its borders
39 
These were not the easy-to-dismiss musings of a frustrated SEC commissioner.  They 
were not musings lacking real world impact.  The American Bar Association quickly 
took the proposal from the article—considered to be “the most influential piece ever 
published by the Yale Law Journal”
40 as the basis for study and a Business Lawyer-
ABA symposium on federalizing corporate law, a real-world indicator the Delaware 
players would surely not ignore.
41 
If Cary’s proposal for federal minimal standards once hit Delaware hard, that 
would be enough to put down a brick or two in the foundation of the argument I am 
building—that Delaware’s principal competitor is Washington.  But there is more.   
The article still stings Delaware players, 25 years later.  I hear them—today, in 2002—
arguing against Cary’s mistakes and how misguided it would have been—and would 
be today (more of that soon)—to federalize any key part of corporate law.  I can say 
from conversations with sitting Delaware judges that they are aware of the possibility 
of federalization, and are still chafing 25 years later under the rhetorical whipping from 
Cary’s attack. 
3. Consciousness. We obviously cannot psycho-analyze the Delaware players to 
see if they’re consciously weighing the possibility of federal ouster or otherwise 
reacting to federal pressure.  But we can from time-to-time detect their consciousness 
of the federal possibilities. 
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Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, 94
th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).  
37 Cf. Fischel, supra note 4, at 916. 
38 Cary, supra note 5, at 701. 
39 Id. at 696, 700-03. 
40 Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW xi (1993). 
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Consider how one critical takeover decision began:  This is an issue of national 
importance, said the judge first.  True, this could be simple breast-beating.  Or it could 
be Delaware visibly assessing whether it had room to maneuver.  Was it constrained by 
the federal position?  With the eyes of the federal authorities upon it, was Delaware 
really free to maneuver?   The latter consideration is made much more plausible by the 
Court’s statement a few pages later that although the SEC intervened, it had split 3-2 
on whether to seek to intervene.  With the interested Federal authority divided, 
Delaware could act.  The implication is that if the federal view were cohesive, 
Delaware would have more trouble exercising its discretion. 
There are revealing speeches.  During the takeover controversy, one Delaware 
justice commented that Congress was not doing much anymore to control takeovers 
right then, implying that the Delaware judiciary had increasing room to maneuver.
42  
And even when Delaware players did not have their eye on what Congress was doing, 
they had reason to know that media criticism could induce federal action.
 43   
The Delaware consideration might not just be fear.  It could be respect:  As the 
Delaware Chancery court said only a few years ago:  “An administrative agency—the 
Securities and Exchange Commission—has a technical staff, is able to hold public 
hearings, and can, thus, receive wide and expert input.”
44  Either way, Delaware is 
looking to the Federal authorities as one basis for decision-making. 
Consider now, more carefully, a recent speech from Delaware Chief Justice.  
First off, he recognizes the paper-thin protection that the internal affairs doctrine gives 
Delaware.  Even where state courts are arguably primary—in internal affairs—“the 
federal securities regulatory regime is a force in influencing the internal affairs of 
corporations.” 
45  And “the New York Stock Exchange … impose[s] … internal 
standards … [like] minimum standards for audit committees.”
46 
But the “internal affairs doctrine” is a long tradition, he pleads, albeit one that 
could be ended by federal preemption.
47  The Enron debacle and the ensuing 
controversy over corporate governance could end it, already inducing Congressional 
and SEC proposals to deal with what otherwise might be internal affairs of the 
corporation.
48  Then he argues why that traditional separation should not be ended.  He 
                                                           
42 Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
779 (1987). 
43 The Wall Street Journal editorial page, always acerbic and particularly influential during 
the Reagan-era, lambasted Delaware’s partial validation of the poison pill.  See Review & Outlook:  
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not propose a federal solution.  It is, after all, the Wall Street Journal. 
44 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
45 Veasey, supra note 19.  Veasey’s speech was delivered last April, at an American Bar 
Association function. E. Norman Veasey is the Chief Justice of Delaware. 
46 Id. at 3. 
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“sells” the virtues of Delaware over Federal preemption and ouster: trustworthy courts 
with “integrity, expertise, diligence, good faith, independence and professionalism.”
49  
Although “the Enron foment has provoked debate about the effectiveness of [state-law] 
standards governing directors[,] … [my] thesis is that the Delaware model works well, 
over all, … and that one should be cautious in concluding that current events dictate a 
new … regime of corporate governance.”
50   
Delaware is obviously a major creator of the current regime, he argues further.  
A new regime might not have Delaware at its center is the implicit fact here.  Where 
might that new regulatory regime come from:  “There are competing bills in Congress 
addressing corporate responsibility.”
51  And the SEC might swing into action:  “[The 
SEC chair,] Mr. Pitt [says Justice Veasey, quoting the Wall Street Journal,] has been 
proposing numerous changes to tighten corporate governance, accounting and 
disclosure standards in recent months, in part to head off  … action by Congress.”
52  
One might see a sense of wistfulness here emerging in Delaware:  Enron has already 
moved the arena into jockeying between the SEC and Congress, with Delaware on the 
sidelines. 
Three months later Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, which swept aside key 
areas of corporate governance and corporate law previously governed by state law. 
    
C. Has Displaced 
 
So we know that Federal authorities could displace Delaware.  We know the 
“internal affairs doctrine” is just an understanding that can be, and has been, breached.  
And we know that Delaware players comprehend that it can be, and has been, 
breached.  Here I show how Federal law already deeply affects internal affairs that 
Delaware purports to regulate.  I also show several instances where Delaware said 
“yes” to a practice, and the federal authorities simply turned around and said “no.”  
And in several instances Delaware changed its rule in response to the federal action.  
These specific transactions are going private, the all holders rule, regulation of the 
leveraged buy-out, and dual class recapitalizations. 
Several matters would in any abstract notion of the corporation be considered 
internal affairs, yet they are not just governed by federal authority, but we hardly hear 
a whimper anymore from internal affairs doctrine purists that this is so.  The securities 
laws themselves effectively control the voting process in large American firms.  One 
would have thought that this is probably the single most important institution of 
corporate internal affairs.  Yet, since 1934 voting is governed primarily by the 
                                                                                                                                                   
… [W]e try harder, because life would be much less interesting without the corporate activity that 
engenders all this … interesting work.”   Id., at 33. 
49 Veasey, supra note 19, at 5. 
50 Id. at 4.   Cf. Leo E. Strine, Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on the Corporation 
Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUSINESS LAWYER 1371, 1372 (2002):  “Hanging in the 
balance are important issues… .  Congress may even … federaliz[e] key elements of corporate law  
… .”   Judge Strine is a sitting Vice Chancellor in Delaware. 
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Exchange Act, the SEC rules, and federal courts’ interpretations.   Similarly, one might 
have thought that accounting could be an internal matter—the reports of the 
corporation to its stockholders—but these are all federally regulated.  Indeed they 
became federally regulated because of the pre-1934 view that the states just were not 
doing enough to mandate and make accurate the flow of information from the 
corporation to its own shareholders.  The securities acts are not just regulating the 
“external” trading of stock on Wall Street or the “external” relationship when the 
corporation sells its stock to the public.  They regulate what in the abstract would be 
seen as internal affairs, if we did not have this tradition since 1934 of viewing proxy 
voting and deep detailed accounting to shareholders as matters of federal, and not 
internal, corporate law. 
Federal authorities can take over state law-making on fiduciary duties.  Insider 
trading is one where they have, affecting corporate governance when it’s the managers 
who are buying and selling stock with the company’s shareholders.  At common law, 
the states basically permitted insider trading, and this was one basis for federalization 
in 1933 and 1934.  Whatever state race was going on, insider trading was brought into 
the federal domain in theory in 1933 and 1934,
53 and the ambit of regulation expanded 
in the 1960s with Texas Gulf Sulphur.
54  General fraud liability could be the basis for 
duties that look like state-law fiduciary duties, and courts were making those 
incursions, some of them quite deep, in the 1960s and 1970s, until the Supreme Court 
in 1977 blocked further incursions with Santa Fe v. Green.  And simple disclosure can 
charge up fiduciary duties in a way that state law cannot, if potential plaintiffs cannot 
discover the fiduciary wrong under state mechanisms.  What the SEC decides needs to 
be disclosed—defining the materiality standard, finding causation between trading loss 
and non-disclosure, listing the transactions, and controlling the accountants’ interaction 
and duties—all can, and do, determine which interested party transaction are 
effectively regulated, and which are the quibbles that the law ignores.
55  And lastly, by 
defining issues of professional responsibility—when the company’s lawyers must go 
to the board, blow the whistle; how public an accountant’s resignation must be, 
whether the accountants’ ancillary business with the audited firm must be disclosed—
the SEC is effectively allocating authority inside the firm.  To disclose is to control.  
To put duties on the gate-keepers is to regulate the internal affairs of the corporation. 
And there are also specialized institutions that take away pieces of corporate 
affairs.  The Department of Labor governs pension funds.  The DOL has issued well-
known directives to pension funds—which own one-quarter of American stock—on 
how they exercise their vote in corporate elections.  Mutual funds—which own one-
fifth of American stock—are subject to Investment Company Act restrictions on how 
they vote.  State law might not make their votes public, for example, but federal 
mutual fund law may do so quite shortly.  When leveraged buy-outs were a critical 
feature of the corporate landscape, some authorities thought that state controls were 
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54 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 
(1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
55 See Regulation S-K § 404, which mandates disclosure of wide class of interested party 
transactions in the company’s annual report and any prospectus used to sell securities to the public. DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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lax; federal controls through the Federal Reserve margin regulations then kicked into 
place.  When executive compensation became a hot issue, congress, before the states 
acted at all (i.e., before the race could be run) mandated tax rules on excess 
compensation. 
Sometimes federal authorities drop the pretense of regulating around the edges.  
Sarbanes-Oxley is one such instance.  Congress mandates requirements for boards of 
directors, for relationships with accountants, for what boards must do, and so on.   
Little could be more internal than what Sarbanes-Oxley reaches.  The same for the 
related New York Stock Exchange rules mandating the objective character of the 
directors’ independence, the composition board committees, and so on. 
And Delaware’s origins in the first race involved federalization of the key 
corporate issue of the day.  In the mind-set of that time, antitrust law and corporate law 
were closely intertwined.  The state-to-state incorporation movement of the time was 
first from the state in which business was done, then into New Jersey, then into 
Delaware.  While analyses talk about flexibility and the like as the basis for the race, 
the fundamental issue was of monopolization and cartelization.  The largest firms 
sought corporate organizational mechanisms that would facilitate monopolization and 
cartelization.  When the original incorporating states did not permit the facilitating 
means, the firms used trusts as the means of organization.  When the trusts failed, New 
Jersey provided an organizational alternative.  And then when New Jersey took it 
away, Delaware stepped in.  These maneuvers induced a call to federalize all corporate 
law, so that national authorities could control the organizations that made monopolies 
and cartelized industries.  In the end the apple was cut this way:  the federal 
government took over what “mattered” to them, the antitrust issues of monopolization 
and cartelization.  The states were then relegated to the relatively less important (at that 
time) control of non-monopolizing organization. 
And today there are takeovers, perhaps the states major remaining area of full 
authority.  But it almost did not turn out that way.  Delaware almost lost authority over 
takeovers on three Federal fronts in the 1980s:  the courts were defining takeover 
tactics as preempted by the Williams Act and interpreting state takeover statutes as 
preempted by that Act and the United States Constitution; the SEC was using open-
ended authority from the Williams Act to micro-regulate takeover tactics; and 
Congress was seriously considering a takeover statute that would preempt Delaware.  
By the end of the 1980s, each Federal foray reversed itself, and the Federal authorities 
left takeovers to the states.  But we begin here, as the partial ouster of the 1980s—
which could just as easily been placed in the “inspires fear” section just above, as 
Delaware reacted to federal threats to displace further—because the Delaware 
sequence cannot be well-explained here by either race theory.  But, with the federal 
threat in mind, we can not only explain much of the Delaware move, but we can help 
to explain emerging data on takeovers better than either of the race theories explain the 
data.  
1.Takeovers in the early 1980s.    Consider Delaware takeover law.  Most 
commentators viewed Delaware takeover law as among the most pro-shareholder and 
least managerial in the 1980s.  Its decisions were “proportional;” its antitakeover 
legislation non-existent until the late 1980s, and mild then.  At the same time other DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  19  
 
states were producing one antitakeover law after another, watching them get knocked 
down at the Federal level, as preempted by the Williams Act or the interstate 
commerce clause.  Delaware though passed no anti-takeover laws until 1987, and then 
a mild one.  But by the end of the decade, with the 1989 Paramount decision, 
Delaware turned antitakeover, and hasn’t gone back. 
If Delaware was racing to the top in providing pro-shareholder takeover law in 
the 1980s, why did it stop racing by 1990 or thereabouts?  And if Delaware usually 
races to the bottom, pandering to managers, why did it take so long for it to get there?  
The issues in takeovers were not subtle, and the interstate pressures on Delaware were 
powerful:  The other states were passing powerful antitakeover laws.  (The only issue 
was whether Federal authorities would let these laws stick.)  Managers were pressing 
Delaware to go fully antitakeover.  Their lawyers, evidenced by Martin Lipton’s 
famous public call for reincorporation out of Delaware, wanted antitakeover law. The 
demands of the race were as plain as could be for Delaware.  Lipton said: 
     The Interco case and the failure of Delaware to enact an effective 
takeover statute, raise a very serious question as to Delaware 
incorporation.  New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, 
are far more desirable states for incorporation than Delaware in this 
takeover era.  Perhaps it is time to migrate out of Delaware.
 56 
Yet Delaware’s mid-1980s decisions zig-zagged through takeover doctrine:   
Revlon putting strong duties to sell on directors; Unocal looking for proportionality; 
even Moran said directors would have duties to “yank the pill,” and could not—to use 
the later vocabulary—“just say no.”  Interco did so explicitly:  target managers could 
not use the poison pill to “just say no,” but only to find another bidder or to defeat a 
coercive tender offer, such as a two-tiered offer.  (The two-tiered offer gives more 
money to those who rush to tender, less to those who hold back, creating an incentive 
for shareholders, even those disliking the overall terms, to give up for fear of being on 
the low-value “back-end.”).  But if the outsider made its offer to any and all shares, 
said the Interco court, then the implication of Moran was that the target had to 
dismantle its defensive machinery and could not use new defensive maneuvers.
57  
And the Delaware legislature was quiet, not passing any early anti-takeover 
statute and then, when it did, passing one that was relatively mild.  It was not that the 
legislature did not then know how to respond to managers:  when the duty of care was 
called into question, the legislature promptly facilitated freeing managers from 
liability.
58  They were just quiet on takeovers, not quiet overall. 
                                                           
56 Martin Lipton, To Our Client: The Interco Case, Nov. 3, 1988 (“private” mailing).  The 
idea did not stay hidden.  See Tim Smart, For Managers, Delaware Isn’t the Haven it Used to Be, 
BUS. WK., Dec. 19, 1988, at 33 (“legal advisers to worried managers already are suggesting that 
companies … consider playing elsewhere ….”); Charles Storch, As company, Time focusing on 1 
newsmaker, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 9, 1989, at 8 (Delaware’s blocking Interco management from 
using the pill “so enraged Martin Lipton, the lawyer … credited with inventing the … pill …, that he 
urged his … clients to consider reincorporating elsewhere.”); Stephen Labaton, The ‘Poison Pill’ 
Takes a Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1988, at D2; Roger Parloff, The Outlook of Poison Pills:  
After Interco and Pillsbury, What Next?, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Jan. 24-30, 1989, at 31 
57 City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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Then, around 1989 or 1990, the Delaware courts turned to the antitakeover fork 
in the path.  By including the federal dimension we explain Delaware better than any 
pure race-to-the-top or race-to-the-bottom theory can.  Delaware’s internal political 
structure  could allow for pro-shareholder takeover law because its local political 
configuration differed from, say, the Rust Belt states that the strongest bastions of 
antitakeover law in the 1980s.  Delaware just did not have the antitakeover lobby the 
Rust Belt states had. Still, if Delaware wants the incorporation business, it presumably 
would match the other states bidding in a race.  State-to-state competition should have 
induced it to “match” the other states.  But it did not in the 1980s.
59 
But in the 1980s Delaware had reason to fear ouster from the federal authorities 
more than it had reason to fear the anti-takeover law of the Rust Belt states.  The 
Federal authorities were producing pro-takeover law via the SEC and the courts, and 
threatening to enact preemptive moderate takeover law via Congress.  If Delaware mis-
stepped, if it was too far out of line with the Federal actors, it could tip one or another 
of those actors, especially Congress, into stronger, hard-to-reverse action that would 
oust Delaware of what would become its most important hold on corporate affairs, the 
takeover. 
(a.) The executive branch: White House politicians; SEC commissioners—The 
1980s Washington atmosphere was pro-takeover, before the insider trading scandals 
hit later in the decade.  Reagan-era officials promoted views of takeover entrepreneurs 
like Carl Icahn as populist heroes attacking corporate bureaucracies that had become 
elitist sinecures for the rich and ineffective.
60  There was nothing subtle about the 
Reagan Administration’s pro-takeover actions:  The White House Council of 
Economic Advisors opposed the end-of-the-decade Delaware statute when it was 
proposed, one Commissioner bluntly threatened Delaware with preemption if it 
acted,
61 another said the Delaware legislation would be constitutionally 
impermissible,
62 and the SEC Chair said federal preemption was the proper policy:  
                                                           
59 Delaware has other considerations.  The 1980s takeovers were initiated by outside 
“raiders,” like T. Boone Pickens and Carl Icahn, or by large firms seeking to take-over smaller ones.  
The latter is a Delaware constituency, the former not.  Since many large offering firms are Delaware-
chartered, Delaware has reason to heed their goals.  But over time, the ”raider”-induced takeovers 
declined, leaving only the large firm initiated takeovers.  That would have meant that Delaware 
would over time have had more pressure to be a moderate on antitakeover laws—targets still resisted 
as before, but the portion of the offerors that were Delaware’s corporate constituency increased.  Yet 
during this period, Delaware became more antitakeover when the non-Delaware “raiders” were 
disappearing, not less antitakeover.  The release-of-Federal-pressure story that I develop in the text 
fits Delaware’s movement.  
60 Peter T. Kilborn, Treasury Official Assails “Inefficient” Big Business, NEW YORK TIMES, 
November 8, 1986, at A1.  The speech came from Richard Darman, a key Reagan-era player. 
61 See Letter of Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, to David Brown, Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar 
Association, dated Dec. 10, 1987, reprinted in CRAIG B. SMITH & CLARK W. FURLOW, GUIDE TO THE 
TAKEOVER LAW OF DELAWARE, app. E, at 161, 165 (“a decision by Delaware to adopt an antitakeover 
statute … is more likely to provoke a federal response … ”).  And:  “For present purposes it is 
sufficient to observe that enactment of Section 203 [would] increase[] the probability of federal 
scrutiny.”  Id., at 165. 
62 See Letter of Charles Cox, Commissioner of the SEC, to the Council of the Corporation 
Section of the Delaware Bar Association, date Dec. 10, 1987, reprinted in SMITH & FURLOW, supra 
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“Federal law should control [takeovers] by preempting state statutes that unduly 
interfere with the free transferability of securities.”
63  In case Delaware did not get the 
message, the SEC Chair two months later wrote a leading Delaware corporate lawyer 
(one deeply involved in drafting the Delaware law), quoting the preemption speech to 
him, the lawyer who would in due course become Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court.
64  Delaware acted, but, compared to every other state, it acted 
moderately. 
(b.) The courts and constitutional preemption; the Williams Act and the SEC—
And courts through most of the 1980s were knocking down most (but in the end not 
all) state anti-takeover statutes as conflicting with the dormant commerce clause: 
The Illinois Act is … unconstitutional … for even when a state 
statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the burden imposed 
… must not be excessive in relation to the local interests served …  
The most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate 
commerce arises from the statute’s ... nationwide reach  … giv[ing] 
Illinois the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed 
anywhere. … Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell 
their shares….  The reallocation of economic resources to their 
highest valued use … is hindered.  The incentive the tender offer 
mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that 
stock prices remain high is reduced.
65 
At the same time, the courts were defining the on-the-ground takeover tactics as 
covered by the William Act’s provisions banning manipulative or deceptive practices 
in tender offers.  In Mobil v. Marathon, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Marathon Oil’s 
giving of a crown jewel option to U.S. Steel to ward off another party’s takeover offer 
was a manipulative act, one that the Williams Act barred. Mobil Oil had sought to buy 
Marathon, whose managers did not want to be employees (or, more likely, ex-
employees) of Mobil if Mobil succeeded.  They gave U.S. Steel an option to buy 17 
percent of Marathon’s stock (a “lock-up”) and an option to buy part of Marathon’s 
huge, rich Yates oil field (a “crown jewel” option).  If Mobil succeeded it would find 
key assets leaving (at below market prices) and be obligated to sell stock to U.S. Steel 
at a price favorable to the buyer.
66  If the decision persisted, all takeover tactics would 
be regulated nationally, not by the states.  
                                                           
63 Address by SEC Chairman David S. Ruder, 26
th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, 
Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 7, 1987), quoted in Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder to E. Norman 
Veasey, Esq, dated Dec. 8, 1987, reprinted in SMITH & FURLOW, supra note 61, app. C, at 155.  
Veasey would thereafter become chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. 
64 Id. (letter from SEC Chairman Ruder to Norman Veasey).  The letter from Chairman Ruder 
is remarkably simple.  It’s only one blunt page, stating “I believe that Federal law should control 
[takeovers] by preempting state statutes ….  I believe that corporations whose activities and 
ownership are national in scope should not be given protection against takeovers by the states [even 
those] where their primary production facilities are located.”  These matters, he said, by the way, 
were not internal affairs of the corporation, but national affairs:  notice how the line for internal 
affairs gets drawn based on what one wants to, or does not want to, regulate. 
65 Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). 
66 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6
th Cir. 19081), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 
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When Delaware allowed targets to self-ender without including the larger, 
offering shareholder in the tender, the SEC promptly reacted with its all-holders rule, 
simply turning that switch off. 
(c.) And Congress of course—Congress was a big threat to Delaware.   
Congressional committees held hearings, considered legislation, and at some points 
was thought likely to take control of the takeover issue.  And what was the 
contemplated Congressional action like?  If it was pro-takeover, or middle-of-the-road, 
then Delaware had reason to fear that a sharp anti-takeover act on their part would 
provoke Congress into a) action, and b) federal preemption.  Did Delaware have reason 
to believe that its main competitor in the 1980s in making takeover law was the federal 
government, especially the congress? 
Consider the simple fact that the principal bill considered in the late 1980s 
would have preempted Delaware.  Little else could make Delaware sensitive here.  
Antitakeover activists in management aggressively opposed the preemption provisions 
of the proposed bills.  Bruce Atwater, an articulate spokesman for the managers, so 
testified.  The Business Roundtable and the National Association of Manufactures also 
opposed federal preemption.  Shareholder activists did not.
67   
And the bills’ substance was middle-of-the-road, not anti-takeover.  Although 
they regulated bidders tactics, extending and deepening the Williams Act style notice-
rules on offerors, the bills would have also come down hard on defensive tactics, 
including the poison pill.  The principal bill, the one introduced by Representative 
Dingell and Markey, the big players in the House, in its section entitled “Abusive 
Defensive Tactics:  Poison Pills; Lock-up; Tin Parachutes, would have authorized the 
SEC to issue rules making it “unlawful for any issuer to establish or implement, during 
any proxy contest or tender offer … any defensive tactic in violation of such [SEC] 
rules.”  And so that the SEC would not mistake the anti-pill message, the act said that 
“at a minimum, [its rules must] treat as a defensive tactic requiring shareholder 
approval” of any poison pill measure.
68  
Most importantly for the thesis here—that if it’s big, Congress might step in—is 
that Delaware had reason to fear full federal preemption.  Consider just the title of an 
article from one widely-read business periodical:  “States vs. Raiders:  Will 
                                                           
67 See Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation, 19 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 851 (June 12, 1987).  Professor Roberta Romano argues in a well-known 
passage in her well-known book, that congressional law-making would have been as anti-takeover as 
the state legislation.  This it might have been—we’ll never know for sure.  But, first, well-known 
anti-takeover activists from the Business Roundtable, like Bruce Atwater lobbied against federal 
preemption:  if the federal bill would overall have been as, or more, pro-manager as state law, what 
worried them about a federal act?  Second, the leading bill contained anti-poison pill measures that 
management detested, measures that are the core of managerial defensive tactics that the states 
validated.  Although Romano states that poison pills were not a part of the federal takeover bills, 
ROMANO, supra note 4, at 80, she presumably is referring to bills from the early 1980s, not the 
Dingell-Markey 1987 bill, which would have ended the pill. Her conclusion though is understandable 
given her focus.  She collated the takeover provisions of bills introduced from 1969 to 1987, and used 
that as a measure.  Id. at 79.  But the poison pill did not become a serious tactic, or even an issue, 
until about end of that period.  And it would have been banned by the most serious bill, that of 
Representatives Dingell and Markey, the chairs of the relevant committee and sub-committee.   
68 Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. Bill 2172, Apr. 27, 1987, 100
th Cong., 1st Sess. 
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Washington Step In?”
69  Consider next the second federal fact and how it tracks 
Delaware development:  by the early 1990s, the Federal authorities, once pro-takeover, 
disappeared from actively making, or even thinking about making, takeover law. 
(d.) The Federal abdication—It came first in the Courts, with the Supreme 
Court cutting back first on the William Act’s preemptive power:  manipulative 
practices were interpreted to include bid-rigging, not defensive maneuvers and strong-
arm bidding tactics.
70  But Edgar v. MITE’s preemptive power—the states could not 
burden interstate commerce, even if the Williams Act did not allow federal authorities 
to regulate takeover tactics—still stood, until CTS ended it in 1987, when the Supreme 
Court reversed circuit court preemption of state antitakeover action.   
The SEC though was still visibly pro-takeover in 1987, and it influenced 
congressional policy-making.  But in the following few years its once aggressive 
stance faded away.  Personnel changes best explain the result—a drafter of state anti-
takeover legislation went onto the commission in the early 1990s, at the same time as 
its most vociferous pro-takeover commissioners left it.
71  Congress too finally faded 
from the field by the end of the 1980s, and stayed untempted to return in the takeover 
drought of 1990 to 1992 and the strong economy of the later 1990s. 
(e.) The Federal gravitational pull on Delaware?—Delaware’s moves roughly 
can be explained by the federal moves.  When the federal government was overall pro-
takeover, Delaware was reticent or middle-of-the-road, proclaiming proportionality, 
and zig-zagging from Moran (itself with limits) to Revlon (tough, anti-manager, pro-
takeover), resisting passing an anti-takeover statute longer than the other states, and 
passing a mild one when it acted.  Then with Paramount in 1989 Delaware became 
anti-takeover.  Zig-zagging stopped for the most part (or the anti-takeover zigs were 
sharper than the moderate zags.   
We can trace the cases briefly, although this story is well-known.  Unocal 
announced proportionality in 1985;
72 ten years later, in 1995, the Delaware Chancery 
Court, arguably following the Unocal standard ten years later was then reversed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin.
73  Unocal, decided in 1985, was not a pure pro-
takeover decision.  At the time the other states were producing very strong 
antitakeover law (via legislation and statute), but this decision is usually viewed as 
intermediate:  responses by managers had to be proportional to the outside threat to the 
corporation or its shareholders.  Reaction had to be proportional; “just say no” was 
                                                           
69 Vicky Cahan, States vs. Raiders:  Will Washington Step In? BUSINESS WK., Aug. 31, 1987, 
at 56.  The bill would also have required one-share, one-vote and a mandatory bid rule. 
70 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
71 Compare pronouncements from Joseph Grundfest, an aggressively pro-takeover Reagan 
appointee, see Grundfest Letter, supra note 61, and Joseph Grundfest, Subordination of American 
Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (2000), with actions by Stephen Waldman, a later appointee who drafted 
Pennsylvania’s tough antitakeover laws. 
72 As did AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. 1986).  See 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics:  Is 
there Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 BUSINESS LAWYER 247 (1989). 
73 Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 193 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) with Unitrin, 
Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).  The 1994 QVC decision does not fit this 
line, but was arguably pushed back by Unitrin in 1995.  Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (applying Revlon duties). DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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unlawful.  If the race is to that bottom, one wonders why Delaware not only did not run 
there, but also for most of the 1980s did not hit an antitakeover bottom.  The federal 
threat story I offer here plausibly explains Delaware.
74  Delaware went for the middle 
ground.  And still the SEC overturned the specifics of Unocal, barring a selective self-
tender (although not touching the proportionality standard of the decision).
75 
In Revlon, the Delaware courts were tough on targets:  once the firm was to be 
sold, the board could not pick and choose but had a fiduciary duty to conduct a sale 
that would yield the shareholders the highest dollar, presumably through an auction.
76  
This duty was considered so important that lawyers referred to at as the “Revlon duty,” 
often quipping about how a target company was entering “Revlonland.”  Moran 
validated the pill in 1985, but said that managers could use the pill to ward off coercive 
offers, not to “just say no.”   
But by the end of the decade the takeover machine hits Paramount and 
“Revlonland” became a very, very small place.  There was in Paramount what 
everyone would call a sale of Time, via a merger between Warner and Time.   
Paramount was offering more for Time, and the players might have thought that Time 
had entered “Revlonland,” with a Revlon duty to sell to the highest bidder.  But the 
Delaware Supreme Court said the board could pursue “a deliberately conceived 
corporate plan … unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy….   
The board dismissed Revlon’s relevance (the company was being sold not broken up), 
and Time’s shareholders lost Paramount’s $200 per share bid, with Time management 
forcing Warner’s lower $138 per share on them.
77 
How did 1985 and 1989 differ?:  I submit that what happened was that the 
Federal government withdrew from the takeovers.  With the federal pressure off, 
Delaware could act more freely.  Its main competitor in making takeover law had 
given up.  It could then act more freely, either implementing its own conception of the 
proper role of management in takeovers, or buckling under managerial pressure, or 
concluding that there was no percentage in have its own takeover rules differ 
substantially from those of sister states (which were overwhelmingly anti-takeover) if 
the Federal pressure had abated. 
One could argue that the federal authorities exerted a gravitational pull up 
during the 1980s, and, when they released Delaware at the end of the 1980s, Delaware 
dropped to the bottom.  Or, one might argue that the federal government’s gravitational 
pull continued, but shifted.  By the early 1990s Washington takeover politics was 
                                                           
74 One might say that “proportionality” was not just the duty of the board (to fashion a 
response proportional to the threat) but was also where Delaware was:  proportional, or in the middle 
between Washington and the Rust Belt states. 
75 Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10. 
76 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).  
77 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  And: 
Delaware law confers the management of the … enterprise [on] the  … board … [, which]  
select[s] … a time frame for achiev[ing] … corporate goals.  That [task] may not be delegated to 
the stockholders.  Directors are not obligated to abandon … corporate plan[s] for a short-term 
shareholder profit … . 
Id. at 1154.  This passage is still read in Delaware as rejecting Interco’s limits to the board’s 
discretion in resisting a takeover.  See In re Pure Resources, Inc., 2002 WL 31300797 n.38 (Del. Ch. 
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changing.  Scandals in inside-trading and at Drexel Burnham were de-legitimizing 
takeovers.  The stronger economy by the mid-1990s seemed not to need takeovers to 
perform well, so public-spirited policy-makers had less reason to focus on takeovers as 
an engine of economic renewal.  Political changes in Washington removed the most 
pro-takeover players from the White House and the SEC.  In this second view, 
Delaware moved in tandem with the Federal mover, maybe a little faster and a little 
farther, but still roughly in tandem.  
The Federal gravitational force also fits the direction of change in newly-
emerging data, albeit roughly and with a lag: New data associates Delaware 
incorporation with higher firm value than incorporation in other states in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and the most plausible explanation is Delaware’s mildness on takeovers.
78  
This premium disappears by 1995 in the initial follow-on study.
79  The data fits racing 
badly (if to the top, why did it take so long? If to the bottom, ditto?).  It fits the Federal 
gravitational pull better.
80  Some time after Delaware had made its point—and some 
time after it was free from takeover federalization—the data moved, with Delaware’s 
premium over other states for shareholders disappearing. 
*   *   * 
So, whether or not one adopts a release theory or a movement-in-tandem theory, 
the result here—the fear of federalization thesis and a federal gravitational pull—is 
central to understanding the making of American takeover law.  When its main 
competitor was competing, Delaware toed a line closer to Washington than to the other 
states.
81  
2. Four specific sharp federal incursions. We have four specific modern 
instances of Federal law directly displacing state corporate law:  going private 
transactions, the all-holders rule, the leveraged buy-out, executive compensation, and 
dual-class recapitalizations. 
                                                           
78 Daines, supra note 1. 
79 Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect (Harvard Law School working 
paper, 2002).  Subramanian confirms the Daines’ Delaware premium for the period before 1996.  
Another study finds no Delaware premium in 1999:  Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ 
Decisions Where to Incorporate (Harvard Law & Economics Paper No. 341, 2002).  And, another 
study shows data consistent with Delaware incorporation as beneficial at the beginning of the 1990s 
but detrimental by the decade’s end.  [Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate 
Governance and Equity Prices (NBER Working paper no. 8440 (Aug. 2001).] 
80 The misfit is the lag:  the Delaware effect disappears, but not right after Delaware turned 
anti-takeover.  Subramanian’s explanation is that it took a while for Paramount to sink in.  Another 
possibility is that it first sank in via the decline in hostile takeover activity in the early 1990s right 
after Paramount (and the demise of Drexel during a soft economy), and then sank in deeper via value 
later, when it was clear that the Federal pressure on Delaware was not returning.  In any case, racing 
theory cannot explain the change in the data’s direction; the Federal gravitational pull does better. 
81 One might counter the now-standard view that American takeover law no longer facilitates 
hostile takeovers with the rise in takeover frequency in the second half of the 1990s.  The prevailing 
academic view (a view that I share) is that higher CEO compensation—vesting those huge options—
facilitated takeovers in the face of antitakeover corporate law.  The managers win, but in a Coasean 
maneuver, they take their winnings in cash instead of tenure.  Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. 
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(a) Going private and the SEC—In the 1960s and 1970s a common corporate 
transaction was to “go private.”  A firm had a controller, with a smattering of public 
stock.  The controller decided to take the firm private, eliminating the public 
stockholders.  Often there were good business reasons:  more confidentiality, lower 
expense, etc.  But whether there were good reasons or not, the price paid and the 
process used were controversial corporate issues at the time.  The SEC wrestled with 
Delaware on this one.  The Delaware cases at first validated going private, holding 
generally that the dissenting shareholders’ only remedy was to get appraisal rights,
82 a 
remedy that many viewed as inadequate. 
The SEC disgust with these Delaware case was hardly hidden.  SEC 
Commissioner A.A. Sommer, after reciting the terms of a going private transaction in 
which the firm went public and then private in which the dominant shareholder would 
gain 400% “without a single dime of additional investment [from] her!”  The 
Commissioner concluded:  I would suggest there is something wrong with that.”
83  
Moreover, the problem is generic:  “[f]or some time now there has been widespread 
criticism of the inadequacies of state corporation law.”
84  And, he added, “[t]here are 
many reasons for [the recent] expansion of federal law.  First has been the recognized 
insufficiency of state laws.”
85  Why insufficient?  Because “Delaware [is] notorious for 
the favor its laws show to management, often at the expense of shareholders.”
86 
Eventually the SEC promulgated Rule 13e-3:  “Going Private Transactions By 
Certain Issuers …,” which expressed more scorn for state law than did Commissioner 
Sommers, albeit more politely:  “[A]pplicable state law ha[s] not always provided an 
adequate remedy to the potentially deleterious effects of going private transactions.”
87  
Delaware shortly afterwards reversed itself.
88  Via the late 1970s Delaware decisions, 
says a critical analyst, “the Delaware Supreme Court … strengthened considerably the 
power of minority shareholders vis-à-vis management [in going private transaction].”
89   
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Whether Delaware reacted to the SEC chastisement, whether they were 
embarrassed by the SEC’s forced disclosure of pricing information (making the 
Delaware remedies appear inadequate), or whether they were positioning themselves 
with the then-growing, sympathetic response to William Cary’s Federal minimal 
standards proposal in mind is just too hard to ever know.  But the reaction fits 
awareness, pressure, and reaction.  Indeed the courts reversed themselves mid-stream 
on going private.  The Delaware Singer v. Magnavox sequence was:  fist, lower court 
anti-shareholder decisions, punctuated by SEC criticism and action, and finally 
Delaware Supreme Court reversal:  The Delaware Supreme Court overturned the lower 
court’s exclusive remedy decision in Singer v. Magnavox, allowing disgruntled 
shareholders more remedies than just the weak appraisal remedy and requiring that the 
defendants satisfy a test of “entire fairness.”
90  The leading text on mergers and 
acquisition law speculates that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision is best 
explained as one intended to deter turning the talk of more federalization into actual 
federalization.
91  And shortly thereafter the Supreme Court went further, overturning 
the specifics of the restrictive mechanics of the earlier exclusive remedy decisions as 
well.
92 
If Delaware were reacting to federal pressure to be tougher on controllers, then 
one would expect the controllers to complain. And they did.  Anecdotal evidence is 
that in the early 1980s, Delaware was looked upon suspiciously as a state of 
incorporation: “corporate lawyers [were] recommend[ing] against Delaware 
incorporation … [because] Delaware’s judiciary was too ‘moralistic.’”
93  (It’s possible 
to speculate that Delaware’s final moralizing reaction to Cary and the 1970s 
federalization debate came in 1985 with Van Gorkom—the toughest, most anti-
managerial decision to come out of the Delaware courts.  That decision put Delaware 
at risk of losing reincorporation business until it retreated, as the legislature did a year 
later with § 102(b)(7), effectively over-turning the judges’ work in Van Gorkom.) 
This though—Delaware’s early 1980s moralizing—is inconsistent with a pure 
race-to-the-bottom theory, which portrays Delaware as pandering to those who initiate 
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the reincorporation decision:  managers and controllers.  It is, however, consistent with 
a theory that depends on federal pressure as critical to Delaware’s calculus. 
Perhaps the judges did not understand that they were supposed to be racing.  
The report of anti-Delaware reincorporation pressure, anecdotal to be sure, is, 
moreover, inconsistent with either race theory:  If “toughness” is racing to the top, 
Delaware should have garnered charters from those looking for toughness.  If 
“toughness” is racing to the bottom, then Delaware should have garnered charters this 
way.  To take on a policy that loses charters is to give up on the race.   
Only when we see Delaware as reacting to avoid further federal incursion into 
corporate law-making, does the Delaware result here become explicable.  A policy of 
toughness is consistent with the view that Delaware corporate players had an eye on 
Federal authorities, and felt confined (psychologically or otherwise) by the Federal 
authorities not by the competing states. 
(b). The all-holders rule and the SEC— In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
allowed a takeover target to exclude a bidder from the company’s self-tender for its 
stock.  The discriminatory bid would deter the outsider from taking over the company.   
True, the rhetoric of the decision was moderate—managers could only use 
tactics proportional to the threat the firm and its stockholders.  The two-tiered bid from 
Pickens hurt some shareholders:  shareholders who did not sell to Pickens initially 
would be paid less than those who sold rightaway.  The tactic was unfair to some, and 
potentially manipulative of shareholders.  And Pickens had taken “green-mail” before.  
(That is, he desisted from other takeovers when the company bought back his stock, 
usually at a nice premium.)  The company’s exclusion of Pickens was proportional to 
the threat, concluded the Delaware Supreme Court.  One might consider this an 
internal affair of the corporation, i.e., the matter was one of the firm’s relationship with 
its shareholders, a matter akin to a selective dividend going to some but not all 
shareholders.  Such a matter would usually be regulated by the states.  
Internal or not, the SEC reaction was simple and swift.  With the all-holders 
rule, Rule 14d-10,
94 the SEC demolished the specifics of state law on a selective buy-
back.
95  Nothing uncertain about:  The SEC said their purpose was to reverse the 
Delaware tactical result.
96 
(c). Dual-class recapitalizations and the stock exchanges.  In the 1980s many 
firms recapitalized with dual class stock, by which insiders got stock rich with votes; 
and outsiders voting (perhaps under a collective action debility) to give up their vote.  
Delaware had no problem with dual class recapitalizations.
97  Yet commentators in the 
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main thought mid-stream recapitalizations leaving outside stockholders voteless were 
deleterious.
98  Again, one might have thought the question of voting and of the firm 
asking shareholders to give up their vote (for, say, a slightly higher dividend) would be 
a corporate internal affair.  But the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-5, which had it 
survived would have barred all exchange-listed stock from dual class recapitalization.  
But then the internal affairs doctrine showed itself to have some bite, although it 
ultimately lost.  The DC Circuit invalidated Rule 19c-4:  19(c) of the 1934 Act did not 
allow the SEC to promulgate substantive corporate governance in derogation of state 
corporate law.  These internal affairs are for the states not the SEC.
99 
This seems to have been, and was, a defeated effort at federalization, one that 
would free Delaware from fear of federalization, at vis-à-vis dual class 
recapitalizations.  One might have thought that without an act of Congress, Delaware 
was free. But the SEC has more means to act.  By 1994, the stock exchanges, under 
pressure from the SEC, all put through anti-dual-class rules.  Effectively Delaware was 
preempted again, this time by the exchanges under SEC pressure.
100 
(d). Pensions, proxies, and the Department of Labor. Federalization is not just 
regulation of the company; it is regulation of its stockholders.  Some stockholders are 
directly told how to act in corporate governance.  By telling them how to act, federal 
authorities take key corporate law decisions away from traditional corporate law-
makers.  Pension funds are told via federal ERISA regulation that they must consider 
the corporate proxy in the stock they own to be an asset whose use must be actively 
evaluated.  Mutual funds are about to be told they must announce how they vote on 
proxy initiatives.
101 
These may seem like specialized exceptions, but they cover about half of the 
shares, and companies, in the American economy.  Twenty percent of the stock market 
is owned by the mutual funds; twenty-five percent is owned by the pension funds.
102 
How they—just about half of the American stockholders—act here is governed by 
Delaware law, but by federal law.
103 
*   *   * 
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These are four sharp examples.  There are others, perhaps less sharp, coming via 
other federal means.  Consider the Internal Revenue Code’s efforts on executive 
compensation and the Federal Reserve’s efforts on the leverage in leveraged buyouts. 
In the 1980s and 1990s executive compensation became more controversial than 
it had been.  Congress reacted via the tax code.  Golden parachutes—by which senior 
executives were paid handsomely when they unexpectedly left the firm, were taxed to 
discourage their use.
104  Executive compensation above $1 million was made non-
deductible to the corporation unless the compensation was tied to the company’s well-
being, i.e., tied to the company’s earnings or stock price.  And tax rules required 
shareholder approval for the stock options to be tax deductible.
105 Compensation 
committees came to be regulated more recently.  And, most importantly the SEC 
regularly mandates precise disclosure of executive compensation.   
Executive compensation mechanics could have been seen as an affair internal to 
the corporation.  Some firms might wish to keep compensation private.  They might 
wish that compensation be decided by a board committee whose members can tightly 
prime compensation to performance (however dangerous that kind of confidential 
structure might be).  The internal workings of the firm might militate that 
compensation be hidden from, say, suppliers.  That’s how state law would run here.  
But federal law trumps state law to the contrary:  the compensation must be stated to 
the shareholders, not just the board compensation committee.  And the shareholders 
now approve that compensation (or vote it down), and the composition of that board 
committee is determined not under state law, but elsewhere.  
In the 1970s and 1980s leveraged buyouts became common.  A cousin to going 
private transactions, they begin with a controller, either inside managers or an outside 
buyout firm with a thin equity investment, using the buy-out company’s assets to 
borrow heavily.  These were perceived by many as “going too far,” as adding too much 
debt to (some) corporate balance sheets, as destabilizing the firm, making it riskier and 
more brittle.  (To be sure, much evidence, maybe the weight of the evidence, was that 
the LBO’s induced more efficient management.
106  But that’s not the race point here:  
the theory point is that when it is important, the transaction attracts federal attention.) 
LBO’s might have been regulated via corporate law, and an adjunct to corporate 
law, fraudulent conveyance law did come into play.
107  But Federal authorities reacted 
as well, via the Federal Reserve’s re-regulation of borrowing for corporate 
acquisitions.
108  The regulation had bite, and it was seen as “shot across the bow” for 
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leveraging transactions: that if they went further, the Federal Reserve would react 
further. 
*   *  * 
These two subtle incursions and four sharp federal incursions regulating going 
private transactions, mandating an all-holders rule, barring dual-class recapitalizations, 
and mandating how half of the country’s shareholders treat their vote would be enough 
to see how federal law can displace state corporate law.  But there’s more, in the 
pervasive aspects of securities law in regulating of shareholder voting overall, in 
creating of quasi-fiduciary duties via insider trading and more, via subtle nudges and 
shifts in shareholder voice in the 1990s, and finally, via Sarbanes-Oxley, in taking 
central aspects of corporate governance away from the states.  
3. The structure of securities regulation.  Even putting aside specific 
transactions of recent decades, we clearly have two major sources of regulation of the 
large corporation in the United States, state corporate law and the securities law.   
Corporate commentators regularly point to the overlapping authority and the conflicts, 
and the courts try sometimes to separate out the two contesting authorities.  
The legislative history of the 1934 Act is instructive.  The first congressional 
report recommended full federal incorporation for firms in interstate commerce, not 
just a securities statute.  While the pure-form of federal incorporation was not taken 
up, pieces of that plan entered the 1934 Exchange Act.  Critics of the 1934 Act said 
that core provisions were really federal incorporation rules and should not be part of 
the statute.
109  They became part of the 1934 Act anyway, and people just stopped 
thinking of, say, voting and insider trading as internal affairs, so that the facts could be 
reconciled with the articulated internal affairs standard. 
Consider voting:  the wide system of proxy regulation from the SEC determines 
what goes into the proxy request to shareholders, what can get onto the ballot—such as 
corporate governance proposals that might fail under state law, who gets access to 
shareholder lists, and how a proxy fight (what could be more basic and internal?) is 
waged. 
Or consider the corporation’s and its officers purchase of stock from the 
corporation’s stockholders:  The corporation’s and its officers’ buying and selling of 
common stock was validated by the states at common law, and that state result was one 
of the bases for congress to pass the securities laws, to take regulation of insider 
trading in stock away from state corporate law and federalize it. 
(a.) The view in 1933 and 1934—Delaware and the states were seen as not 
inducing adequate, modern information dissemination from the corporation to its 
shareholders.  Indeed the states generally required no information dissemination.  The 
annual election was considered sufficient to induce the incumbents to disseminate 
information sua sponte.  Nothing more was needed, although little information was 
disseminated under state law.
110  With states defaulting on forcing information 
disclosure, the stock exchanges stepped in early.  The first major disclosure effort in 
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the United States came in 1907, not from New Jersey or Delaware (the principal 
competing incorporators at the time), but from the New York Stock Exchange.
111   
And on other issue Delaware seemed deficient to Federal players.  In the late 
1920’s Delaware amended its statutes, in a mis-timed act to allow corporations to 
waive some long-standing protections for shareholders, and to authorize directors to 
issue “blank stock whose full terms would be set later by the board.
112 Adolf Berle, an 
influential commentator of the time, “scathingly” attacked these acts as amounting to 
the “power of confiscation.”
113  The point here is not to assess whether Delaware was 
racing to the bottom (or to the top), but that the Federal authorities reacted.  (The 
Delaware provisions plausibly were sensible, but the provisions riled those who were 
listened to in Washington, and Delaware’s acts contributed to a federal response.) 
Disclosure to current shareholders (not just disclosure to external buyers) was 
federalized in 1934.  Indeed, effectively all of corporate accounting has been 
federalized.  It’s done by the FASB, with input and influence from the SEC.  When 
accounting controls fail, as in Enron and WorldCom, we look to Federal authorities to 
fix the problem, not to state corporate law. 
(b.) The vote—Arguably the core of corporate law is the shareholders’ vote.  
The view is now well accepted that the annual proxy solicitation is effectively 
controlled by SEC regulation, with state law having long faded to a secondary role.  
Hornbooks tell us:  “SEC regulation is in fact so pervasive that … the very structure of 
the proxy solicitation process is not only informed but dictated by SEC regulation.”
114  
Or that logically, “[i]n a more perfect world, proxy regulation would be handled in 
state corporation statutes.”
115  The logic is there, but the reality is that the central act of 
shareholder control over the board—the annual election of the directors—is 
overwhelmingly a matter of federal, not state, law.   
Why did the federal securities laws grab jurisdiction over the core corporate 
internal act?  States were seen in 1934, we are told, as having done “virtually nothing 
to cope with the problem … of [abuses in] the solicitation of proxies [for 
management]”
116  
Consider just one mechanical aspect:  access to shareholder lists.  That access 
was once considered less than satisfactory at state law.
117  SEC Rule 14a-7 requires the 
company to mail the insurgents’ proxy statement for them, or furnish them with a list, 
a mechanical act that might have been solely regulated at state law.  Combine Rule 
14a-7 with Regulation 13G, which requires most major shareholders to publicly 
disclose their holdings, thereby allowing precise assembly of institutional shareholding 
lists, and we have nearly complete federal displacement of even the most mundane 
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mechanical aspect of state law:  insurgents’ access to shareholder lists.  The SEC in its 
last early 1990s initiative on shareholder lists was direct, but polite, saying that it 
promulgated 14a-7 to reverse state law, and end the “expense and delay requestors 
typically encounter [under state proceedings] in obtaining a securityholder list.
118 
Or another mechanical, internal voting rule:  state law could allow managers to 
bundle” proposals:  by putting up a shareholder-friendly proposal (special dividend of 
$X) with a less-friendly one (entrenching managers), the shareholder might approve.  
The SEC’s 1992 proxy amendments require that the “proxy provide for a separate vote 
on each matter presented.”
119  And similarly, the SEC allowed shareholders to “mix 
and match” in voting for directors, making it easier for them to elect a minority slate to 
the board.
120  These are all, by any functional view of the term, internal affairs. 
(c).  Insider trading rules to displace state law— Insider trading was effectively 
legal at common law.
121  The corporation and its officers could disclose or not, 
according to their pleasure.  (Lack of privity meant lack of fiduciary duty.)  This was 
seen as sub-optimal corporate governance, and the Federal authorities took over 
regulation of insider trading in 1934.  The rules could have developed out of state 
agency law’s ban on an agent using confidential information to make a profit. They 
could have developed out of fiduciary duty law.  But they did not, and the insider 
trading rules are federal now. 
(d). Federal quasi-fiduciary duties—Even fiduciary duties, perhaps the core of 
common law regulation of the corporation, were not free from federal incursions.  In 
the 1960s and 1970s the explosion of 10b-5 liability was moving federal courts into all 
of the then-current corporate transactions.  The Second Circuit was transforming what 
might previously have been state fiduciary duty issues 10b-5 fraud claims.
122  And 
other circuits were following.  As Richard Jennings, a leading authority on securities 
regulation at the time, said in the mid-1970s:  “most of the important litigation relating 
to corporate mismanagement and shareholder abuse is not conducted in … the 
Delaware courts [any longer]. … [N]o shareholder in his right mind will litigate a 
shareholder grievance in a Delaware state court if some other forum is available ….”
123 
Delaware’s competition for the issues of the day came from the federal courts—
“the flight of shareholder litigants from the state to the federal courts has been … 
massive”
124—and commentators thought that 10b-5 would soon govern sales of 
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control, going-private transactions, corporate opportunities (which after all visited a 
type of fraud on the firm), self-dealing, and so on.
125  They so thought, that is, until the 
tide crested (and thereafter receded) with Santa Fe v. Green.
126  The point here is not 
that the federal authorities always take over, but that the possibility of their doing so 
affects Delaware, and often does so more than a state-to-state race affects it.
127 
And the influence continues today.  To disclose an act is to control that act.  
Transactions might be banned under state law, but the mechanism that sorts out those 
that survive and those that fail is in large measure the mechanism of disclosure and the 
means of gate-keeping.  These two are now largely done under the securities laws, not 
state laws.  While the formal division of authority is said to be that the SEC is 
disclosure-forcing, trade-regulating, while Delaware and the other states handle the 
internal affairs of shareholder-director relations, there is more going on here.  This is 
the formal division, but savvy lawyers, judges, and analysts know better.  Much 
substantive law can be, and is, made in the name of disclosure.  For many regulatory 
tasks, just making the transaction public is sufficient regulation to control it.  To force 
disclosure “This company is run by thieves” is usually sufficient to shut down the 
practice, and, hence, ex ante, to keep the thieves out, a matter formally of internal 
affairs not disclosure, but one that can be, and is, effectively restricted as much by the 
federal disclosure statutes as the local state rules. 
4. Subtle shifts.  Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, one could detect shifts of 
authority in the corporation, shifts induced by federal rules. 
(a.) Reallocating power insider the corporation via shareholder voice—Some 
micro-analysis of the SEC rules is here instructive.  We need not analyze precisely 
every federal-state over-lap, but let us look carefully at one.   
A core state law concept is that its board of directors manages the business of 
the corporation; corporate lawyers just refer to this as Delaware § 141.
128  Shareholders 
cannot call in directions to the board on business strategy and plans.  The board is 
primary. 
But consider the evolution of the SEC’s Rule 14a-8.  The SEC allows, 
notwithstanding state law, that shareholders get access to company’s proxy solicitation 
under Rule 14a-8.  The SEC’s own exclusions though were historically so large that 
the rule was for decades not a governance tool, but a mechanism for social protest:
129 
                                                           
125 Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 
BUSINESS LAWYER 883 (1976); Boyer, supra note 27, at 1054. 
126 430 U.S. 462 (1977).  Santa Fe ought not though to have lifted fear of federalization from 
the states., as it explicitly invited congress to act:  “There may well be a need for uniform federal 
fiduciary standards to govern mergers,” said the Court, “…[b]ut those standards should not be 
supplied by judicial extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to ‘cover the corporate universe.”  
430 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis supplied). 
127 Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 49 BROOKLYN  L. REV. 1 (1993); ALLEN  & 
KRAAKMAN, supra note 110. 
128 Del. Gen’l Corp. L. § 141. 
129 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Dow Chemical 
and napalm), vacated for mootness, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992); NYC Emp. Retirement System v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 
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proposals on corporate structure or the allocation of authority between directors and 
shareholders were excluded.  Nothing could get onto the company’s proxy solicitation 
that dealt with ordinary management of the corporation.
130  Nothing could get in that 
was improper under state law; this ban thus respected Delaware § 141—that the 
business of the corporation is to be managed by the board:  no policy initiatives from 
the shareholders, the board reigns.
131 
But in a subtle 1990s shift, the SEC has forced managers to give access to their 
proxy statement to shareholders’ “precatory” proposals on corporate governance.  In 
its Waste Management decision, the SEC forced management to accept a proposal on 
increasing the independent directors on the board, and there since have been a slew of 
anti-poison pill measures and anti-staggered board precatory votes.
132 
One might cynically think this just lets off shareholder steam.  That might be 
right.  And boards could ignore their shareholders’ “precatory” vote, as some have.  Or 
one could see this as the SEC pressing into the territory formerly governed exclusively 
by Delaware Gen’l Corporation Law § 141:  if the proposal is precatory, the 
shareholders vote, and the board might be wary of ignoring a shareholder vote.  Voice 
is not direction, but it is a means to power; and the SEC by enhancing shareholder 
voice has subtly shifting the shareholder-board balance otherwise drawn by Delaware 
§ 141. 
(b.) Gate-keeping and whistle-blowing as federal corporate governance—  
Corporate governance is often about gate-keeping:  Before the corporation acts, must it 
get a certification from an outsider, from a professional whose reputation (and liability) 
is on the line?  Gate-keepers include the company’s attorneys, its accountants, its 
underwriters, and so on.
133  The SEC regulates gate-keeping and gate-keepers closely.  
The detail is best left out here, but each of the main gate-keepers need to be conscious 
of their responsibilities under federal law, and maybe less so under state law.
134  To 
impose a duty on lawyers or accountants to bring the perceived wrong-doing up the 
corporate chain of command is to control the substantive act.  It is internal corporate 
governance.  And it is Federal law, not state corporate law. 
Consider one prong in the federal response to the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the SEC to make rules requiring 
attorneys representing securities issuers to report evidence of material securities law 
violations to the company’s chief legal officer or chief executive officer.  And if either 
“does not appropriately respond (adopting … remedial measures or sanctions with 
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132 SEC No-action Letter to Waste Management, 1991 WL 178585 (Mar. 8, 1991) (staff 
refuses no-action letter when Waste Management seeks to exclude shareholder proposal on 
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respect to the violation),” then the lawyer must go to the board’s independent directors, 
the board’s audit committee (which must be independent under a separate directive) or 
the entire board.
135  The violations for which the lawyer now becomes a serious gate-
keeper are not just securities law violations, but any “breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation.”
136  These are internal affairs, and this is a federalization of the 
corporate control of state fiduciary duties.   
Auditors are under similar and stronger duties:  to report violations of law first 
to senior management, and if management responds unsatisfactorily, to go to the board 
and the SEC as well.
137  And internal control systems (what affair could be more 
internal?): Judge Allen recognized that with the Federal sentencing guidelines from 
1991, the balance of internal controls had changed:  The guidelines give a big break to 
corporations with effective compliance programs in place.  And Allen in Caremark 
rests his analysis on whether the defendant company had that kind of a system in place.  
It did not.  They should have, and Allen effectively over-turned earlier Delaware 
authority.  In Allis-Chalmers, managers violated the antitrust laws, severely damaging 
the company.  Held the court:  no obligation for an internal compliance system; no 
gross negligence liability of directors.  What had happened in the interim?  Partial 
federalization of the reasons to have internal corporate systems, via the federal 
sentencing guidelines.
138  And in 2002 the rules on internal control systems were made 
explicit, not piggy-backed to federal sentencing guidelines:  Sarbanes-Oxley mandates 
that management assess the control systems and represent that they’re adequate for the 
company’s business. 
(c.) Creeping preemption—And in the 1990s, a shift little-noticed
139 but one 
would suspect vivid in Delaware:  The federal securities laws repeatedly have savings 
clauses, affirmatively saving parallel and supplementary state rules and remedies.  But 
in the late 1990s Congress in rapid-fire succession passed the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
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Act of 1998,
140 laws that not only reject traditional savings clauses (that respect 
parallel state law) but explicitly eradicate contrary state law:   
[N]o law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of 
any State, or any political subdivision thereof … shall directly or 
indirectly apply to … a covered security.
141 
Congress explicitly understood the race (to the top or bottom) issues, and 
squelched the race: 
Without a national standard … the potential threat is always there 
that one [s]tate will change its laws in such a way as to become the 
haven for [such] litigation.  This almost happened in California last 
year ….”
142  Congress was seeking not to end state-to-state confusion 
but to preempt particular state law.
143 
The point again is not that federal law is necessarily improving upon state law-
making that raced to the bottom.  The merits of the federal preemption—and of the 
substance of the statute itself—are debatable.  The point is that states in general, and 
Delaware in particular, cannot just look to other states as their competition.  Federal 
authorities can trump the state race, and they do.  The 1990s preemptions did. 
5. Dropping pretense:  Sarbanes-Oxley.  This was all true before Sarbanes-
Oxley, and Sarbanes-Oxley does not even pretend to stay on the disclosure/trading side 
of the division of power, not even offering up rhetorical respect for state rules 
governing the corporation’s internal affairs.  It digs deep into corporate governance, 
regulating the nitty-gritty.  In reaction to the Enron-class scandals, Congress mandated 
structures and responsibilities.  States were perhaps perceived as having been lax on 
controlling the internal structures—consider Delaware’s General Corporate Law 
§  102(b)(7), which along with its 40-odd state followers facilitated the wholesale 
dropping of board liability for duty of care violations—so Congress would mandate 
what firms must, and must not, do.   
Some Sarbanes-Oxley rules may not be well-considered:  several babies may 
have gone out with the bath-water.  The Act’s flat ban on company loans to officers,
144 
if literally interpreted, means that firms cannot lend funds to relocating new CEO’s, 
                                                           
140 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77-78). 
141 11 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West Supp. 1999).  The drafters knew exactly what they were doing, 
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142  Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 160 Before the 
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could not lend officers money to buy the company’s stock, etc.  Delaware’s express 
rule was (and is) to the contrary—“[a]ny corporation may lend money to … any officer 
of the corporation … including any officer … who is a director … whenever, in the 
judgment of the directors, such loan … may reasonably be expected to benefit the 
corporation”
145 and it may be the better rule.  But the point is that the federal behemoth 
took over the issue, squelching the states with substantive federal law, effectively 
wiping out Delaware’s statute specifically permitting loans to executive officers.
146 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that the SEC issue rules requiring audit committee 
independence.
147  It controls compensation by requiring that a class of bonuses be 
forfeited if the company goes bankrupt.
148  It mandates that the audit committee 
control the hiring and firing of accountants, and the ancillary business that the 
accountants do with the corporation.
149  It mandates rotation of audit partners, and 
pushes toward rotation of the accounting firm.
150  It orders the SEC to grab control of 
off-balance sheet transactions and special purpose vehicles.
151  It sets up the possibility 
of federal control of who may and may not sit on a corporate board.
152  Once these 
matters were for state law.  No more.  Now federal authorities, not the state legislature, 
not the state courts, and not the board of directors regulate them.
153 
6. Delaware’s origins in the first federalization.  It’s not just modern, and it’s 
not just Sarbans-Oxely in 2002.  A hundred years ago, the late 19
th- and early 20
th-
century state-to-state race mixed antitrust and corporate law mandates in a way that 
would today seem odd.  That is, we have separate categories now for antitrust and 
corporate law, and separate regulatory domains.  This separation though did not prevail 
from the 1880s through about 1915 or so.  When we trace out the interaction here 
between antitrust and corporate law, and state and federal law, we see that the federal 
government first considered taking everything away from the states (since the issues 
were mixed and it sought to control some of them), and eventually took away antitrust, 
severing the two categories.
154 
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For example—and this is not trivial to the concept or the federalization issues—
when the Ohio Attorney-General attacked Standard Oil, he did so on a mixture of 
antitrust and corporate authority.  Standard Oil had pulled the oil industry into a anti-
competitive structure via a set of trust arrangement:  the Standard Oil trust in New 
York held the stock of most of the American oil industry.  Standard Oil’s entry into the 
trust arrangement was ultra vires the Ohio corporation, he argued to the Ohio courts.  It 
was ultra vires because such an action—a restraint on trade—was not something the 
Ohio legislature would have authorized Standard Oil to do in its charter, and Standard 
Oil’s authority came from its charter.  The Ohio Supreme Court agreed and ordered the 
trust dissolved.
155  Why had Standard Oil entered into the trust?  Its cartel was 
unstable, for normal cartel reasons.  (Cartel members agreed to cut production and 
raise price, but when they saw the attractive price they increased production.  The 
increase in production—i.e., the increase in competition—then lowered price.  The 
cartel tended unravel.)  Standard Oil would have liked simply to acquire the oil 
companies with which it had entered into the trust arrangement, but Ohio corporate 
law did not authorize it to acquire the stock of another non-Ohio corporation.  (Not just 
Standard Oil was involved:  other trusts were under similar attack from other states.  
The Cotton Oil Trust—a big trust operation at the time—was organized in 1884 to 
process cottonseed oil and sell the byproducts of animal feed, fertilizer, and soap.
156  
Tennessee and Louisiana attacked the trust, and their courts sought to shut the trust 
down.
157) 
New Jersey became the mother of trusts largely because it authorized New 
Jersey corporations to acquire the stock of non-New Jersey corporations, thereby 
facilitating organizing monopolies as holding companies rather than as trusts.  Usually 
this is presented as New Jersey modernizing corporate law, by making it more 
flexible.
158  This it did—the claim is accurate—but the issue at the time was not 
ordinary management, but monopolization.  And monopolization was so important that 
the federal authorities eventually took away part of the then mixed-issue of antitrust 
and corporate law from the states. 
This can be properly seen as a state-to-state race at first:  states raced to provide 
flexible terms that would facilitate Standard Oil’s monopoly.  (Ironically, this was 
good for its shareholders, bad for the public).  New York was approached, but refused.  
New Jersey, with a budget problem, and more susceptible to private influence on the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Brandeis’ lead-in sentence was:  “The removal by the leading industrial states of the limitations upon 
the size and powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction that 
maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself but to the conviction that it was futile to 
insist upon them.”  288 U.S. at 557-58.   Brandeis was speaking of the states willingness to allow 
corporate growth, and to give the corporations the means to monopolize, means that he opposed.  The 
states were actually provided pro-shareholder rules, by facilitating monopolization. 
155 State of Ohio v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892).  More precisely, it 
ordered the Standard Oil of Ohio—the key players in the trust—to drop out. 
156 A LFRED  D. CHANDLER, JR., THE  VISIBLE  HAND: THE  MANAGERIAL  REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 326-27 (1977) 
157 Mallory v. Hanour Oil-Works, 86 Tenn. 598 (1988).  See Stephen Marshall, New Jersey 
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legislature at that time, acceded.
159  So New Jersey passed its first pro-monopoly 
corporate law in 1889, and continued to make its corporate laws easier for the trusts in 
the 1890s.
160  A year after New Jersey’s first corporate law liberalization for the 
monopolizing firms, Congress passed the Sherman Act, formally taking away the 
authority New Jersey had bestowed on the corporation to enter into one type of 
combination (the interstate corporate merger) in restraint of trade.  It remained to be 
seen how the act would be enforced, but if effectively enforced all that the federal 
government left the states was (relatively less important) authority to regulate non-
monopolizing mergers.  Not trivial, but not the core issue of the time.  
And then the Delaware-New Jersey race began:  New Jersey made 
monopolization mechanisms easy, as long as the federal authorities were silent under 
the Sherman Act.  Delaware copied the New Jersey rules, but firms were happy 
enough with New Jersey that they did not move.  Then, two decades later, Woodrow 
Wilson as Governor sought to take away the flexibility, because New Jersey should not 
be the mother of trusts.  Wilson attacked monopoly, not corporate flexibility.   
Reformers had excoriated New Jersey’s corporate law as facilitating national 
monopolies, and Wilson agreed.
161  He campaigned against monopoly (not flexibility) 
when he ran for governor in 1910, although he made no proposals to the legislature 
during his first years as governor.  But then in the 1912 Presidential election, Theodore 
Roosevelt taunted Wilson for being an ersatz reformer, when he, Roosevelt, had busted 
up trusts.  So in Wilson’s 1912 message to the state legislature he acted:  “The 
corporation  laws of the State notoriously stand in need of alteration.  They are 
manifestly inconsistent with the policy of the Federal government. …  The laws of 
New Jersey, as they stand, so far from checking monopoly actually encourage it. …  
We should act upon them at once.”
162  The core element was a local antitrust act:  
making it illegal for a corporation to acquire a monopoly, limit production, fix prices.  
Thereafter, New Jersey repealed its corporate law authorization for holding companies, 
the means for monopolization.  New Jersey corporations lost authority to buy the stock 
of competitors.
163   
And Delaware then grabbed the business.  New Jersey was shutting the antitrust 
barn doors after their authority had already fled the states:  By the time Wilson induced 
the state legislature to act (after the 1911 Standard Oil decision meant real Federal 
antitrust action), the big antitrust authority was removed from the states, and all that 
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the federal authorities left to the states was corporate flexibility.  But presidential 
debates between Roosevelt and Wilson are not as accurate as we can be on the 1912 
efficacy of state corporate law in combating the trusts, and action followed the 
contemporaneous perception.   
That this was then a mixed issue of antitrust and corporate law was well-
understood at the time,
164 although it usually disappears from today’s accounts.
165  The 
federal authorities took the big stuff away—the mechanisms that would strongly affect 
profits and capital costs—leaving the smaller mechanics for the states. 
*   *   * 
And so we see a history of repeated federal intervention—actual or 
threatened—in corporate law-making.  Whether it was the early mixed issues of 
antitrust and corporate reorganization, or the 1930s issues of shareholder voting and 
insider trading, or the 1960s issues of going private, or the 1970s issues of fiduciary 
duties, or the 1980s takeovers, or the early 21
st century issues of scandals and effective 
internal governance, the federal government has been a player in the key corporate 
issues of the day.   
In each case one could argue that the federal ouster (or threat thereof) was 
“special,” so important to the national economy that the “normal science” of corporate 
decision-making and state racing could not continue.  But that is exactly the point:  
when the issue is truly important, federal ouster happens, or is threatened.  Delaware 
cannot look just to the other states when it confronts a big issue, but to Washington, 
where its most important competitor sits. 
 
IV.   THEORY:  WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT HAD, AND CANNOT   
HAVE, A TRUE RACE 
 
A. An Inconclusive Academic Debate? 
  
Fine minds have argued the states race to the top.  And fine minds have argued 
states race to the bottom.  And data has been brought forward to prove states race to 
the top;
166 data has been brought forward to show that states race to the bottom.
167  The 
debate seems stalemated, and the perspective here of an omnipresent federal trump 
helps to explain why the debate has been and must be inconclusive.  Because key 
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decisions have been removed, or have faced the threat of removal, we cannot tell 
whether the big ones that remained and are efficient were shaped by good federal 
influence (because the federal government is the custodian of the American economy) 
or whether the big ones that remained and are inefficient were shaped by pernicious 
federalism (because the federal government has a monopoly position, unaffected by 
interstate competition but susceptible to error and to influence from interest groups, 
and can accordingly impose inefficient corporate decisions that raise capital costs).   
And it must be inconclusive because we live in a federal system.  Absent, say, a 
constitutional amendment barring federal involvement in corporate affairs, the federal 
government can determine, will determine, and has determined critical elements of 
corporate governance.  The current state of affairs—a tradition of deference to state 
regulation of corporate affairs, a tradition that is breached only when it seems very 
important to federal actors—is the most deference that the federal government can 
realistically give.  And with that level of deference, Delaware corporate law 
theoretically must be, as it has been, subject to influence and ouster by the federal 
authorities, thereby rendering any true race to the top impossible in fact, however 
attractive it might be in theory. 
 
B. The Impossibility of Interstate Race-to-the-Top Theory 
 
Let’s say we have conclusive evidence that the dominant incorporating state has 
produced efficient corporate law.  That evidence would not, and could not, be 
conclusive on whether state competition in corporate chartering is efficient.  We would 
not know whether the federal threat made it efficient.  Was Delaware prepared to race 
to the bottom, but did fear of SEC ouster on that issue make it come out right? 
We have some organizational theory parallels on which a new theory of the 
production of corporate law might be built.  Decisions are said to improve if the 
process of proposal is separated from the process of ratification, if we have two 
separated decisions, by different decision-makers, e.g., managers propose, the board 
ratifies.
168  And we have the corporate theory that efficiency was enhanced by having 
decentralized managers run the firm day-to-day, subject to review, veto, and overall 
strategic planning from the centralized and separated headquarters.
169  Similarly, one 
might begin a new theory with the view that the federal authorities do little if nothing 
seems badly askew in corporate results or Delaware law.  But if one of these 
deteriorates badly, the federal authority intervenes:  state autonomy for the most part, 
but not complete insulation. 
So it could still turn out that we have a “genius” of American corporate law,
170 
but not one as conventionally understood.  Several of the Federal “interventions” seem 
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to favor shareholders overall, and a serious evaluation might conclude that at the 
current level of Federal influence, Federal authorities have induced better corporate 
law.  That would not necessarily mean we would want more intervention, in a way that 
would shut down all state law-making, and deny the system the benefit of 
experimentation.  Discovering that we have an optimal level of Federal intervention 
might induce players to go for more, to test the limits, and that might demean the 
quality of law overall.  But if Delaware does in fact produce law that is good for 
shareholders, we cannot tell whether it did so due to federal pressure or due to state 
competition. 
 
C. The Necessary Indeterminacy of the Race-to-the-Bottom 
 
Suppose the contrary, that Delaware corporate law is demonstrably inefficient.  
Would we then know that Delaware raced to the bottom?  We would not, because we 
would not know whether Federal politics would have produced bad law, due to, say, 
populist outrage or interest group maneuvering or congressional sloppiness.  And 
Delaware might have concluded it had to do the “wrong” thing, because otherwise the 
federal authorities would take it away from Delaware. 
One general possibility: Proponents of Delaware’s advantages point to 
Delaware’s fine judges.  Yet, analysts also point out the fuzziness of many decisions 
that do not yield a firm rule (“facts and circumstances”), but fulminate against 
breaches of fiduciary duty (but do not hold liability).  This federal competition theory 
can help explain the fuzziness:  If one is uncertain of what the politics will be (or is) in 
Washington, better to be fuzzy and immunize oneself from harsh criticism from taking 
an unpopular stand.  So, a strong anti-managerial stand in takeovers might motivate the 
managers to petition congress.  But a strong and clear anti-shareholder stand might 
motivate the SEC (at least in the 1980s) to promulgate new rules or to go themselves to 
Congress.   So better to be fuzzy, to be reasonable, and to lay low.  And when one 
actually decides, zig-zag from decision to decision, so as not to offend any of the 
federal players that might react and attack.  And only come to rest with a strong 
position when it is clear that the federal authorities (all of them) have lost interest, or it 
becomes clear that they are all pointing in the same direction as you are. 
The problem is even harder.  Imagine that there’s a “right” balance between 
rules that give managers discretion and rules that limit managers discretion.  Of the, 
say, ten rules that matter, they all should be somewhere in the middle, or five should 
confine managers and fine should give them much discretion.  Let us say further that 
we observed the dominant state always giving managers discretion.  Since we know 
that the “right” balance is somewhere in between, we might falsely conclude that the 
states have raced to the bottom, in that area where the Federal authorities had left them 
discretion. 
But we could not properly reach that conclusion.  Ten rules matter.  The states 
with residual authority over five of them give managers exactly what they want on 
those five.  But if the other five Federally-set rules all confined managerial authority, 
then, since the right and efficient result is a 50-50- mix, the state were, on a system-DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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wide basis, efficient and racing to the top, despite that locally they overly favored 
managers and appeared to race to the bottom.  
To decide that states raced, and would race, to the bottom, we would have to 
know what they would do if they could control the entire mix.  But this is something 
that in a federal system, with an active central law-maker, we cannot know. 
 
D. Revising the Race with a Federal-State Model 
 
American corporate law has produced in a model more complicated than a pure 
state race.  Understanding that there cannot be a pure race, that the Federal behemoth 
looms large in much state decision-making, does not mean that there is not state 
variation.  States may compete, but the stakes are lower than is usually thought.  In 
effect, the states can race, to the bottom or the top, only when the Federal authorities 
leave the field, and convincingly display no interest in coming back into the field, or 
when the states know that there is a “band” in which they can maneuver without 
provoking any Federal reaction. 
To see how the model must be complicated than a simple state-to-state race, 
let’s take a Delaware perspective here; and let’s take the Delaware state-by-state race 
seriously.  Delaware then we see can find itself in a bind:  It can end up fighting a two-
front war, and from time-to-time has.  First, in the traditional model, it competes with 
other chartering states for the charters.  But, second, it also competes with the Federal 
authorities in making corporate law.  And its two main competitors have differing 
motivations, which do not always lead to the same substantive result.  (In fact, 
Delaware might at times fight a three-front war:  bigger states with local interest 
groups have differing goals than both Delaware and the Federal authorities.  So, during 
the 1980s Rust Belt states plausibly were ready to protect local managers and local 
labor from takeover-induced disruption, irrespective of the effect on local corporate 
chartering revenue; they were less sensitive to the Federal magnetic pull, because 
chartering revenue was unimportant to them.)
171   
 
E. Taking the Long View 
 
If we step back from any particular state act to take the big picture view, we can 
see Delaware as engaged in something more important than a state-to-state race.   
Begin our big picture view a quarter of a century ago in the 1970s.  Delaware was 
perceived as badly protecting shareholders in the prevailing transactions of those 
times.  Federal players consider displacing Delaware with Federal incorporation; Cary 
lambasts the pygmy and the SEC attacks Delaware’s going private rules.  Delaware 
                                                           
171 That states sometimes, as today, do not compete directly on chartering—the thesis in 
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3—does not eliminate the state “front” in the war:  Contestable market 
theory tells us that Delaware could have room to maneuver as a quasi-monopolist, but could lose the 
business if it badly mis-steps.  Second, some states, maybe many states compete in different 
dimensions, such as local corporate social policy, employment, managerial protection, etc., not on 
corporate chartering.  The authors recognize the second point, and the first point I make in a little 
more detail above, at note 15. DELAWARE’S COMPETITION  45  
 
adjusts, to the point that by the early 1980s it is not seen as an attractive place for 
reincorporation, due to the moralizing tone and substance of its court decisions,
172 
culminating with Delaware’s 1985 Van Gorkom attack on American management. 
State competition seems subdued; the Federal threat shaped Delaware law much more.  
Only after Van Gorkom does the possibility of reincorporation out of Delaware turn 
substantial, and Delaware becomes less more solicitous of management, via, say § 203.   
At the same time, Delaware could not move to be fully pro-managerial in 
takeovers because the Federal government was either pro-takeover (the SEC and the 
executive branch generally, and the judiciary until Schreiber and CTS) or moderate 
(Congress via the Dingell-Markey bill that would have barred key defensive measures 
like the poison pill).  So it hedges and zig-zags.  Unocal validates only “proportionate” 
defensive measures.  Moran allows the pill to ward off coercive bids and says a close 
look on “yanking the pill” will be had, and Revlon promulgates tough auction rules.  
Then the Federal players leave the scene.  First the courts with CTS, then Congress, 
and eventually (although later) the SEC via personnel changes.  By the 1990s, drafters 
of state anti-takeover legislation were appointed to the SEC, and the toughest pro-
takeover commissioners had left.  The Paramount decision, close to “just say no” for 
management stands, and the Federal pressure to push it back is gone. 
And then in the 1990s Delaware breathe freely free from Federal pressure, and 
observers see stability in Delaware’s anti-takeover rules.  Federal pressure on 
Delaware in the 1990s was weak (relative to its weight in the rest of the 290
th century).  
Congress, after it abandoned a takeover law project by the late 1990 was quiet.  The 
SEC had few new initiatives after the 1992 proxy reforms.  Conservative courts were 
deferring to the states, not using securities law to expand federal governance authority.  
Delaware could garner more of the reincorporation business as federal incorporation 
(the 1970s issue is off of the table), and the data show an accelerating trend in 
Delaware garnering the reincorporation business.
173   
But that era came to an end with Enron.  With Sarbanes-Oxley, the Federal 
authorities are back in motion, and Delaware has every reason to once again be 
conscious of the possibility, and already in several dimensions the reality, of ouster and 
federalization.  One would expect Delaware corporate institutions to start to get 
“tough” just as they did in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Some observers detect that 
movement already.
174   
 
                                                           
172 See Coffee, supra note 93 & accompanying text. 
173 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 79. 
174 Lawrence Lederman, Robert S. Reder & Gene Boxer, A Blow for States, THE DAILY DEAL, 
Oct. 25, 2002:  “Perhaps Pure Resources represents [Vice Chancellor] Strine’s effort to regain some 
momentum for the state in corporate governance.  Ironically, the vice chancellor strikes his blow by 
incorporating various aspects of federal tender offer regulation—board recommendations and 
disclosures—into the requirements for a transaction state statute does not specifically address.”  The 
authors are corporate lawyers. The lawyers’ analysis is of In re Pure Resources, Inc., 2002 WL 
31300797 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 2002). DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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V.  EUROPE 
 
Two important initiatives have moved the race theory from the American to the 
international stage.  In Europe, the Centros decision, the most famous corporate 
decision to come out of the European Union, sets Europe up for an inter-jurisdictional 
corporate race, one between the EU member nations.  The European analysis focuses 
on the parallels to the American race debate,
175 with some looking, or hoping, for a 
race to the top, and others fearing a race to the bottom. 
At the same time, an academic debate has erupted in the United States on 
whether securities law should be governed by a race—i.e., whether to allow an 
American issuer decide to be bound by French securities law, without moving to the 
jurisdiction or issuing securities there.
176 
The European discussions take the American race debate at face value.  But the 
United States does not have, and cannot have, a pure interstate race.  So those who 
look to international competition in securities regulation cannot point to the American 
race as a parallel, because the securities regulation competition would not have a 
centralized vetoing institution.  And those who analyze the EU’s Centros debate need 
to understand that the full parallel brings Brussels—the EU centralized decision-
maker—into the picture.  If Brussels is effective, defective or ineffectual, then that 
affects the race.  For the Europe and American parallels to be kept, Brussels must be as 
good or bad as Washington.  Europe has reason to focus as much on having an 
effective but not heavy-weight Brussels as it should on the fineries of inter-
jurisdictional competition.  But it is the latter that seems to have thus far occupied 
analytic attention.  The European Union structure—of a centralized corporate authority 
with the capacity to trump the “local” national authorities is in fact the structure—
notwithstanding the rhetoric of state-to-state racing—that the United States has had all 
along.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The reality of American corporate law making is that if the issue is important,  
Federal authorities either take it away from Delaware or threaten to do so.  Delaware 
players have reason to fear that if they mis-step, the Federal authorities (congress, the 
courts, the SEC) will enter the picture.  If Delaware players appear to damage the 
                                                           
175 See the discussion in Eddy Wymeersch, Centros:  A Landmark Decision in Company 
Law, in C ORPORATIONS, CAPITAL  MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW 629-54 (Theodor Baums, 
Klaus J. Hopt & Norbert Horn eds., 2000).  Cf. Barabara Trefil, European Company Law:  Comments 
and Meta-comments on Centros, 2 GERMAN L.J., at ¶7 (Dec. 2001); 
176 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE  L.J. 2359 (1998); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors not Issuers: A Market-Based 
Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:  
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.  CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).   
Skepticism for the idea can be found in Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and 
Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 649 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, 
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice in Note Investor Empowerment, 85 
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economy, public-spirited law-makers in Washington react.  If they offend a powerful 
interest group too much, and that group lacks clout in Delaware, the group turns to 
Washington.  As such, the United States has not had, and cannot have, a pure interstate 
race. 
If American state-made corporate law is good, one cannot necessarily conclude 
that the good result is due to state competition, because side-by-side with any 
horizontal state competition is the vertical power of the Federal government.  And if 
the state results produce bad corporate law, we cannot tell whether the states are 
mirroring defective decision-makers in Washington. 
The instances of Federal ouster are just too many to be ignored.  Hardly a 
decade went by in the 20
th century without a major shift of corporate law-making, or 
the threat of one.  Federal incorporation dominated the debate in the early 1900-1910 
era, and then again in the early 1930s.  It came back in the 1970s, mostly in the form of 
Cary’s famous proposal for minimal federal standards.  The securities laws in the 
1930s took voting away from the states, took insider trading away from the states, and 
mandated information delivery to shareholders because the states had done nothing 
about it.  Micro-matters were reversed by federal authorities:  the going private rules 
were partially federalized and the SEC’s actions and rhetoric provoked a Delaware 
reversal; state law allowed selective buy-backs and the SEC reversed them; the states 
allowed voting discrepancies among shareholders but the stock exchanges under SEC 
pressure reversed them.  For a time the circuit courts were turning fiduciary law into 
federal law, and while that diminished, some still remains.  New securities rules in the 
1990s obliterated state parallel law by expressly preempting the state.  And Sarbanes-
Oxley, reflecting Congressional hunger in 2002 to react to the Enron scandals, 
mandates a host of corporate governance matters, from the power of the audit 
committee, to management construction of internal control systems, to the micro-
details of loans to managers.  All these were once the province of state law. 
If states produce good corporate law, we need new theory to explain why.   
Perhaps that explanation will come from parallels to organizational theory, which 
recommends separating authority to propose from authority to ratify.  Perhaps it will 
come from a Montesquieu-type separation of powers, checks and balances argument.  
Perhaps it will come from parallels to the corporation with centralized strategic 
planners who do not run the operations day-to-day, but who give operating executives 
a budget limit and who stand ready to take over a lack-luster division’s management.  
It will not come from reconstructing the race-to-the-top theory, which just does not 
describe what is possible in a functioning federal system.  If American corporate law is 
good in the end, it may well derive from this vertical organizational advantage as much 
as it derives from competition among the states for the charter business.   
But this theoretical angle is only a possibility, not a necessity.  More plausibly 
what we have just done is undermined the last century of corporate law thinking on the 
interstate race.  There cannot be a pure race such as has been posited if there’s a 
Federal system, where the Federal player can take the issue away from the states.  We 
live in such a Federal system.  And the possibility is not theoretical, as every corporate 
crisis—the stuff that tests the quality of corporate law—raises the threat or the 
actuality of the issue moving from the states to Washington.  The idea of a pure race, DELAWARE’S COMPETITION 
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comforting as it might have been, is over.  We never have had one in the United States.  
It’s just not possible. 